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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : Case No. 20000698-SC 
v. : 
RICHARD NORRIS, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellee. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-18(a)- l(2)(e) (1997), 
allowing the State to appeal an order of the trial court granting a pretrial motion to suppress when 
upon petition for review the appellate court decides the appeal would be in the interest of justice 
and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(b) (1996), allowing this Court jurisdiction over matters certified 
by the Court of Appeals prior to final judgment. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
First Issue: Is the search warrant at issue in this case unconstitutionally over broad? 
Standard of Review: A specific standard of review for a search warrant that is overly 
broad has not been announced by the Utah appellate courts. Therefore, the Appellee cites a 
federal standard. 
A district court's finding that a search warrant was over broad, "is subject to de novo 
review on appeal." United States v. Learv. 846 F.2d 592, 600 (10th Cir. 1988). 
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Second Issue: If the search warrant is not over broad, does the affidavit in support of the 
search warrant establish sufficient probable cause as to each of the items listed in the extensive 
list of articles sought by the search warrant? 
Standard of Review: The appropriate standard of review applied to a magistrate's finding 
of probable cause is: 
In reviewing the magistrate's finding of probable cause to support a search 
warrant based on an affidavit, we will find the warrant invalid only if the 
magistrate, given the totality of the circumstances, lacked a "substantial basis" for 
determining that probable cause existed. In conducting this review, we will 
consider the search warrant affidavit in "'its entirety and in a common sense 
fashion'" and give "great deference" to the magistrate's decision. The affidavit 
must support the magistrate's decision that there is a "fair probability" that 
evidence of the crime will be found in the place or places named in the warrant. 
State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1259-60 (Utah 1993) (citations and footnote omitted). 
Third Issue: Will the good faith exception articulated in U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 
S.Ct. 3405 (1984), redeem a search warrant that is constitutionally over broad on its face? 
Standard of Review: The question of an officer's good faith reliance is subject to a de 
novo determination by the appellate court. State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730, 738 (Utah App. 1991) 
(citation omitted). 
Fourth Issue: Does a similar good faith exception recognized under the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution exist under Article I, Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution? 
Standard of Review: Whether the trial court erred in it's conclusion that no good faith 
exception is recognized under the Utah Constitution, "is a question of law which we review for 
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correctness, according no deference to the trial court's determination." State v. Contrel 886 P.2d 
107, 111 (Utah App. 1994), cert denied, 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995) (citations omitted). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall 
issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
Relevant Statute 
The following relevant statute is included in Addendum E: 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-9 (1999) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On March 26, 1998 Richard Norris was charged with multiple counts of communication 
fraud pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801 (1953). R. 1-8. 
After being bound over for trial by a magistrate, Mr. Norris filed a motion to suppress 
evidence based on an unconstitutionally over broad search warrant on March 26, 2000. R. 207. 
On March 31 the motion was granted and the evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant was 
suppressed. R. 291-302. 
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On April 12 the State then filed a motion to reconsider, raising new arguments in 
opposition to suppression of the evidence. R. 306-20. After a hearing and consideration of the 
written memoranda, the trial judge reaffirmed his earlier decision and ordered that the evidence 
seized pursuant to the unconstitutional search warrant be suppressed. R. 365-69; R, 384-89. 
The State then petitioned the Utah Court of Appeals for permission to bring an 
interlocutory appeal. The petition was granted and eventually certified to the Utah Supreme 
Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On April 1,1997, Ronald Barton, a Special Agent for the Utah Attorney General's 
Office, Consumer Rights Division appeared before a magistrate in the Third District Court 
seeking a search warrant. R. 264-90 (Addenda A and B). In support of his petition for a search 
warrant Agent Barton executed a twenty-one page affidavit and presented it for magistrate's 
review. R. 264-86. 
The magistrate issued a search warrant that authorized the search of Mr. Norris' home 
and place of business and the seizure of items listed in an attachment, Exhibit "A." R. 287-90 
(Addendum A). Exhibit "A" sets out seven different paragraphs each with an exhaustive list of 
items encompassing almost any document that could be found in a modern business. R. 287-88 
(Addendum A). 
The search warrant was subsequently served and nearly every document and electronic 
media were seized from both Mr. Norris' home and his place of business. R. 240-63 (Addendum 
C). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The search warrant in this case is unconstitutionally over broad. The search warrant 
authorizes the seizure of items listed in an exhaustive list that encompasses nearly any document 
or electronic media likely to be found in a modern business. The overbreadth of the warrant fails 
to meet the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
or Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. Therefore, the search warrant was 
unconstitutionally overbroad and any evidence seized should be suppressed. 
Additionally, the affidavit submitted to the magistrate was insufficient to establish 
probable cause to support the issuance of a search warrant. A common sense review of the 
affidavit reveals serious problems such as conclusory statements that provide no reliable 
information on which a magistrate could base a finding of probable cause, statements wholly 
lacking any indication of where the information came from and what the basis of knowledge is 
and statements based on stale information. After reviewing the affidavit and considering the 
totality of the circumstances, it is clear the magistrate lacked a substantial basis to determine that 
probable cause existed to support even a narrowly tailored search warrant. 
In order to obtain an all records search warrant, the affidavit in support of the warrant 
must show an extraordinary level of corruption. It must demonstrate that all aspects of a business 
and a persons private life are so entwined with criminal activity that a seizure of all records, 
business and private, is a necessity. However, it is not clear that the issuance of an all records 
search warrant meets Utah's constitutional standards. If this doctrine is recognized here in Utah, 
it would require that the magistrate make a specific probable cause determination, based on the 
affidavit, that all aspects of a business were so pervaded with fraud that an all records search 
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warrant was necessary. The affidavit in this case falls far short of establishing that all aspects of 
Mr. Norris' personal life and business were so saturated with fraudulent activity that an all 
records search warrant of his home and his business was necessary. 
If the warrant is constitutionally inadequate, the Leon good faith exception will not 
redeem the warrant. The Leon good faith exception does not apply in situations involving over 
broad warrants that an executing officer could not reasonably rely on. Even if the Leon exception 
applied under a Fourth Amendment analysis of this case, no such exception exits under Article I, 
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
Given the fatal constitutional deficiencies of the affidavit and the over breadth of the 
warrant, the trial judge was correct in suppressing all evidence seized by virtue of the search 
warrant in this case. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE SEARCH WARRANT IN THIS CASE IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OVER 
BROAD ON ITS FACE. 
Both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 
of the Utah Constitution require that a search warrant, "particularly describ[e] the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. Const. Amend. IV; Utah Constitution 
Article I, Section 14. 
The Supreme Court has recognized that, "there are grave dangers inherent in executing a 
warrant authorizing a search and seizure of a person's papers . . . [responsible officials, 
including judicial officials, must take care to assure that they are conducted in a manner that 
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minimizes unwarranted intrusions on privacy." Andresen v. Maryland. 427 U.S. 463, 482 n. 11, 
96 S. Ct. 2737, 2749 n. 11 (1976). 
The search warrant in this case is overbroad on it's face and fails to minimize 
unwarranted intrusions on privacy. Therefore, the search warrant is unconstitutional under both 
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution. 
A. The language of the search warrant is overly broad, therefore, it violates the 
particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. 
The Fourth Amendment requires that search warrants, "particularly describ[e] the place to 
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. Const. Amend. IV. This particularity 
requirement prohibits a "general, exploratory rummaging in a person's belongings." Coolidge v. 
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2038, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971). Furthermore, 
"[t]his portion of the amendment is essentially a proscription against general warrants whereby 
administrative officers determine what is and what is not to be seized. The decision to seize must 
be judicial, as opposed to administrative, and the warrant must be sufficiently particular to guide 
the officer to the thing intended to be seized, thereby minimizing the danger of unwarranted 
invasions of privacy." State v. Gallegos, 712 P.2d 207, 209 (Utah 1985). 
"'A description is sufficiently particular when it enables the searcher to reasonably 
ascertain and identify the things authorized to be seized.'" U.S. v. Wolfenbarger, 696 F.2d 750, 
752 (10th Cir. 1982) (quoting U.S. v. Wuagneux. 683 F.2d 1343, 1348 (11th Cir. 1982)). 
In this case, the search warrant authorizes seizure of, 
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Documents relating to the business activities of RICHARD FRANKLIN NORRIS 
and EMILIO CORTEZ, operating as MAXTRON CORP. (formerly ALTA 
PUBLISHING), SANTOS INTERNATIONAL, and UNITED INVESTORS 
CREDIT SERVICES, INC. 
These documents and computer files are more fully described on Exhibit "A" 
attached hereto. 
R. 289-90 (Addendum A). The attached exhibit then sets out seven extremely broad categories of 
documents that encompass almost any document that could conceivably be found in a business 
establishment. R. 287-88 (Addendum A). The State claims that this exhaustive list set out in 
Exhibit "A" satisfies the particularity requirement. However, the Fourth Amendment requires 
more than simply listing every document that might be found in a modern office. U.S. v. Learv, 
846 F.2d 592, 602 (10th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). 
In Voss v. Bergsgaard, the Tenth Circuit explained: 
The fourth amendment requires that a search warrant describe the things to be 
seized with sufficient particularity to prevent a "general, exploratory rummaging 
in a person's belongings. This requirement " 'makes general searches ... 
impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing 
another. As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer 
executing the warrant.'" 
774 F.2d 402, 404-05 (10th Cir. 1985) (emphasis added) (quoting, Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 476 
(U.S. 1971) and Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 at 512 (U.S. 1965)). 
An examination of the Exhibit "A" reveals just how broad and all encompassing the 
descriptions given there are. 
Paragraph A 
Records in whatever form of contacts with customers and clients of MAXTRON 
CORP (formerly ALTA PUBLISHING); SANTOS INTERNATIONAL; and 
UNITED CREDIT, INC., including mailings, receipt of funds, and inquires. 
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R. 288 (Addendum A). 
This paragraph, "when viewed in conjunction with the extremely broad authority 
described hereafter, it is clear that the cumulative is just too great." R. 297-98 (Addendum D, 
trial judge's ruling on motion to suppress). 
This paragraph paints a very broad stroke. It allows the seizure of virtually any document 
relating to customers of any of the listed businesses. However, this paragraph fails to limit the 
search by stating a specific time period relevant to business records that should be seized. In Re: 
Grand Jury Proceeding, 716 F.2d 493, 498-99 (8th Cir. 1983) (warrant seeking the seizure of 
records of a business from 1976 to 1983 was held to be an invalid general warrant as the alleged 
crime took place only in the later part of that time period). 
In Leary, the court observed, 
the government's argument that the warrant was "as specific as the circumstances 
and the nature of the activity under investigation permit" is untenable. Agent 
Juhasz' affidavit in support of the warrant was very specific, alleging the 
attempted illegal export of a specific product to the People's Republic of China 
via a series of specific companies in Hong Kong. Yet none of this information 
was reflected in the warrant. The warrant could have been limited to 
documents related to the Micro-tel transaction, to the companies suspected of 
participating in the illegal export, to the countries involved in the route of the 
export... or to a specific period of time coincident to the suspect transaction. 
Yet the government choose to include none of these limiting factors. 
846 F.2d at 604 (emphasis added). Likewise, this paragraph fails to limit the seizure of 
documents related to specific customers listed in paragraph four of the supporting affidavit or as 
mentioned above a specific period of time coincident to the suspect transactions. R. 285. 
Although the government had information available to it to limit the scope of the search, like the 
case above, they chose not to include these limiting factors in the search warrant. 
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Paragraph B 
Banking records, accounting records, check registers, deposit slips, money order 
receipts, receipts for cashiers checks, cashiers checks, records of wire transfers in 
whatever form showing the source and application of funds received from or 
transferred to persons and/or entities. 
R. 288 (Addendum A). 
Checkbooks cancelled checks, telephone records, calendars, diaries, and word processors 
are no more likely to be related to a defendant's fraudulent business than to his personal matters. 
U.S. v. Falon. 959 F.2d 1143, 1148 (1st Cir. 1992); see also Voss, 774 F.2d at 404-05. 
Documents described by this section are no more probable to be business related than 
they are to be personal matters. Falon, 959 F.2d at 1148. In short, such a broad stroke invites a 
fishing expedition and not a carefully structured search in line with the limits of the Fourth 
Amendment. Furthermore, this paragraph also fails to limit the scope of documents to be seized 
to a specific time period, specific customers or specific transactions. 
Paragraph C 
Records in whatever form relating to mailing and receipt of parcels and packages 
whether U.S. Mail or other common carrier. 
R. 288 (Addendum A). 
This paragraph, "is a broad description permitting a review of all of the incoming and 
outgoing mail of Norris, Maxtron, Santos or United." R. 297 (Addendum D). Furthermore, this 
provision gives no guidelines to the executing officers that would allow them to differentiate 
between Mr. Norris' personal and business activities. This paragraph offers no limiting 
instruction to a searching officer but leaves to the officer's discretion what should and should not 
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be seized, a result not permitted by the Fourth Amendment. Voss, 774 F.2d at 404-05; Galtegos, 
712P.2dat209. 
Paragraph D 
Safes, indicia of safe deposit boxes, storage facilities or similar devices used for 
storage or records or belonging and applications for mail drop boxes. 
R. 288 (Addendum A). 
There is no indication that evidence of a crime was being held in a safe. The crime the 
State has alleged is Communications Fraud. Nowhere in the affidavit in support of the search 
warrant is there any suggestion criminal contraband or evidence might be found in Mr. Norris' 
personal safe. State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Utah 1993) (The affidavit must support 
the magistrate's decision that there is a "fair probability" that evidence of the crime will be found 
in the place or places named in the warrant). 
As with other provisions in the warrant, this provision would allow the seizure of any 
item Mr. Norris kept in a safe whether related to his business or personal life. Again, this section 
of the warrant impermissibly grants broad discretion to an administrative officer. 
Paragraph E 
Promotional materials in whatever form showing the information provided to 
customers and initial solicitation, including copies of the promissory notes and/or 
advertising contracts. Copies of any video and/or audio tapes. 
R.288 (Addendum A). 
This may be the most narrowly drawn paragraph and does provide some guidance to a 
searching officer. However, information was available to the investigator that would have 
allowed him to narrow the scope of this paragraph to include items relating to a specific time 
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period, to specific customers set out in the affidavit or specific transactions. R. 285, ^ 4 
(Addendum B). 
Paragraph F 
Copies of any and all general correspondence and business records including: 
client statements; client contracts and/or proposals; subcontract agreements and/or 
contracts; materials describing company concepts; audio/visual materials; 
invoices for the purchase of or services performed for the editing, marketing, 
drafting or graphic design, printing and/or binding of various publications; bank 
statements; ledgers; books of accounts; accounting and/or financial records 
detailing the daily business activity of the companies; personal diaries, telephone 
logs; appointment books; checkbooks, information pertaining to safe deposit 
boxes; records indicating the location of assets; warehouse shipping and receiving 
records; commission and payroll records; travel records; employee applications; 
marketing scripts; all corporate books and records; documentation of fictitious 
names used by company officers and employees; mailing and/or shipping records 
for both public and private carriers; lease agreements; employment contracts; 
partnership agreements; any and all records which identify or pertain to 
individuals having managerial or supervisory responsibility, including, but not 
limited to, records pertaining to Richard Franklin Norris and Emilio Cortez; stock 
certificates and investment records. 
R. 287-88 (Addendum A). 
The trial judge found, "taken literally, this paragraph directs the executing officers to 
back a truck up to the door and take every business record or file having to do with Norris, 
Maxtron, Santos or United." R. 296 (Addendum D). Furthermore, "on its face, this paragraph 
directs search for and seizure of all business records. There is no limitation, no restriction." R. 
296 (Addendum D). The trial judge went on to observe, "in a clarifying phrase the paragraph 
authorized search for and seizure of such patently irrelevant records as personal diaries, payroll 
records and employee applications. Arguably other records identified also are entirely irrelevant, 
such as lease agreements, employment contracts, travel records and partnership agreements." R. 
296 (Addendum D). The trial judge went on to say, "when read in conjunction with the very 
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broad authorizations set forth in paragraphs A, B and C, the warrant crosses the line from 
constitutionality to unconstitutionality. It is altogether too broad." R. 296 (Addendum D). 
This paragraph includes categories that were specifically disallowed under Falon as they 
would inevitably contain personal information and are no more likely to contain evidence of a 
criminal act than contain items of a personal nature. 959 F.2d at 1148 (checkbooks cancelled 
checks, telephone records, calendars, diaries, and word processors are no more likely to be 
related to a defendant's fraudulent business than to his personal matters). This paragraph allows 
the searching officer to exercise his own discretion to determine what should be seized rather 
than placing that discretion in the hands of the proper judicial authority. 
"A warrant that simply authorizes the seizure of all files, whether or not relevant to a 
specified crime, is insufficiently particular." Voss, 774 F.2d at 406. The vagueness of the present 
search warrant allowed a fishing expedition of the personal records of Mr. Norris by not 
differentiating between business and personal records. 
The unrestricted language of the search warrant inevitably resulted in the seizure of 
personal items which would require extraordinary proof to show that Mr. Norris' entire life was 
consumed by fraud. Falon, 959 F.2d at 1148; see also R. 258-63 (Addendum C, inventory and 
return of items seized, detailing items seized including information related to Laroe International 
which was not authorized by the search warrant). This standard of extraordinary proof has not 
been established through the warrant or the affidavit. 
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Paragraph G 
Any and all information concerning the subject businesses stored in the form of 
magnetic or electronic coding on computer or with the aid of computer-related 
equipment. These media include floppy diskettes, fixed hard disks, removable 
hard disk cartridges, tapes, laser disks, printer buffers, smart cards, memory 
calculators, electronic notebooks, and any other media which is capable of storing 
magnetic coding. Any and all electronic devices which are capable of analyzing, 
creating, displaying, converting or transmitting electronic or magnetic computer 
impulses or data. These devices include computers, computer components, 
computer peripherals, word processing equipment, modems, monitors, printers, 
plotters, encryption circuit boards, optical scanners, external hard drives, and any 
other computer related electronic devices. Including operating systems, 
application software, utility programs, compilers, interpreters, and other programs 
or software used to communicate with the computer hardware or peripherals either 
directly or indirectly via telephone lines, radio, or other means of transmission. 
R. 287 (Addendum A). 
This paragraph suffers from the same deficiencies of the previous paragraph. Like 
paragraph F, this paragraph fails to give any limitations on what can be seized and enumerates 
items that inevitably would contain personal items and are not more related to business activities 
than to personal activities. The trial judge found this paragraph allows the State, "carte blanche to 
review every single computer file of Norris, Maxtron, Santos or United. This authorization is 
over broad." R. 293 (Addendum D). 
In Leary, the court found the warrant invalid because it only contained two limitations on 
the search, 
First, the documents to be seized had to fall within a long list of business records 
typical of documents kept by an export company. Second, those documents had to 
relate to the "purchase, sale and illegal exportation of materials in violation of 
the" federal export laws. In this context - the search of the offices of an export 
company - these limitations provide no limitation at all. The warrant authorizes, 
and the custom agents conducted, a general search of the Kleinberg offices. 
846 F.2d at 600-01. 
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In this case, the extensive laundry list of items listed, in reality provide no limitation at all 
on the scope of the search. Furthermore, the warrant fails to specify with particularity the items 
to be seized. This had the impermissible result of allowing the executing officers unlimited 
discretion in choosing what and what not to seize. Indeed this warrant allowed exactly what the 
trial judge found, "a general rummaging through all of the business records of Norris, Maxtron, 
Santos and United." R. 293 (Addendum D). This search warrant is simply unconstitutionally 
over broad on its face. 
B. Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution proscribes the issuance of general 
warrants. 
Although the language of Article I, Section 14 is nearly identical to the Fourth 
Amendment, the Utah Supreme Court has often interpreted the Utah constitution as affording 
greater protection than its federal counterpart to individuals. State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 465 
(Utah 1990); State v. Thompson. 810 P.2d 415, 416-17 (Utah 1991); Zissi v. State Tax 
Commission of Utah. 842 P.2d 848, 859 (Utah 1992). With this in mind, the Utah Supreme 
Court has recognized, "a central purpose of the requirement of a warrant, issued under the 
authority of a neutral magistrate, is to protect against 'general, exploratory rummaging in a 
person's belongings.' To this end, a warrant should leave nothing to the discretion of the 
officer executing it." State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1217 (Utah 1993) (emphasis added) 
(citations omitted). 
Arguably even if the search warrant is not over broad by the standards of the Fourth 
Amendment it could still be over broad under the broader protection of Article I, Section 14 of 
the Utah Constitution. 
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The search warrant in this case is over broad under the Fourth Amendment. For the same 
reasons, the search warrant is also over broad under Article I, Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution. However, if the search warrant is not over broad under the Fourth Amendment this 
Court may still find the warrant over broad under an analysis of Article I, Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution that may provide greater protection against unreasonable searches and seizure than 
its federal counterpart. 
II. THE SEARCH WARRANT AFFIDAVIT FAILS TO ESTABLISH A FAIR 
PROBABILITY THAT EVIDENCE OF THE CRIME WILL BE FOUND IN THE 
PLACE OR PLACES NAMED IN THE WARRANT. 
In reviewing the sufficiency of an affidavit in support of a search warrant, a magistrate is, 
"to make a practical commonsense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the 
affidavit before him, including the 'veracity' and 'basis of knowledge' of the persons supplying 
hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be 
found in a particular place." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983). 
The Court went on to say, "the duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate 
had a 'substantial basis for . . . concluding]' that probable cause existed. IdL at 238-39, 103 S.Ct. 
at 2332. (citation omitted). 
In determining if a magistrate had a substantial basis to issue the search warrant in this 
case, a review of the affidavit is necessary. A review of the search warrant at issue in this case 
reveals an affidavit permeated with fatal constitutional deficiencies, such as, conclusions of the 
administrative officer, failure to state the basis of knowledge of many of the statements and 
statements based on stale information. 
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A. Irrelevant paragraphs 
The Utah Court of Appeals has held that information that does not aid the magistrate in 
her probable cause determination is irrelevant in a review of whether the warrant was properly 
issued. State v. Potter, 860 P.2d 952, 956 (Ut. App. 1993). Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 did not 
provide the magistrate with facts establishing probable cause that would aid the magistrate in 
concluding that evidence of criminal activity would be found in the target locations. 
Paragraph 1 simply recites Agent Ronald Barton's training and experience. Nothing 
within paragraph 1 establishes cause to believe evidence might be where the agent sought to 
search. R. 286 (addendum B). 
Paragraph 2 states that Agent Barton was working with other law enforcement officials. 
Again this is not information that would help to establish probable cause. R. 286 (addendum B). 
Paragraph 3 sets out the allegations being investigated, communications fraud, money 
laundering and racketeering. R. 285 (addendum B). This paragraph provides no facts to the 
magistrate that would assist her in determining if evidence of criminal activity would be found at 
the target locations. 
Paragraph 4 states that Agent Barton either interviewed or read memorandums of 
interviews of a list of various individuals. R. 285 (addendum B). The paragraph does not detail 
the substance of those interviews, thus, it provides no information to assist the magistrate. 
Paragraph 5 simply states a conclusion that Agent Barton believes that evidence of 
criminal conduct will be found at 4440 Christopherson Dr. #B, West Valley City, UT and 3392 
West 3500 South, West Valley City, UT. R. 284-85 (addendum B). Again the agent's conclusion 
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and description of the two locations he was requesting to search provide no useful information to 
the magistrate to assist her in her probable cause determination. 
None of these five paragraphs provided anything of value to the magistrate's probable 
cause determination. Therefore, these paragraphs should not be viewed as having any bearing on 
whether or not the magistrate was presented with a substantial basis upon which to justify the 
issuance of a search warrant. 
B. Conclusory statements give a magistrate virtually no basis at all for making a 
probable cause determination. 
"Sufficient information must be presented to the magistrate to allow that official to 
determine probable cause; his action cannot be a mere ratification of the bare conclusions of 
others. In order to ensure that such an abdication of the magistrate's duty does not occur, courts 
must continue to conscientiously review the sufficiency of affidavits on which warrants are 
issued." Gates, 462 U.S. at 239, 103 S.Ct at 2333. 
Paragraphs 6, 9, 10-19 and 23 provide the magistrate with mere conclusions that do not 
provide any facts on which the magistrate could base a finding of probable cause. 
Paragraph 6 simply concludes that Mr. Norris was involved in a scheme to defraud 
others. R. 284 (addendum B). This conclusion was of no use to the magistrate in making a 
determination that criminal activity was afoot and evidence of that activity was likely to be found 
at the two locations officers sought to search. 
Paragraph 9 restates the conclusion that Mr. Norris is involved in a scheme to defraud and 
then broadens the conclusion by alleging Mr. Norris' use of several businesses, Maxtron 
(formerly known as Alta Publishing), Santos International and United Investors to perpetrate the 
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scheme to defraud. R. 283 (addendum B). This paragraph provides no objective facts on which a 
magistrate could make her own common sense determination that a scheme to defraud others 
existed and that evidence of that scheme would be found at Mr. Norris' residence and place of 
business. 
Paragraphs 10 through 19 set out in conclusory fashion the State's allegation of a 
fraudulent scheme administered by Mr. Norris. R. 279-83 (addendum B). However these 
paragraphs also suffer from the additional deficit of failing to state the basis of knowledge 
supporting the allegations made in these paragraphs. This additional deficiency will be discussed 
below. 
Paragraph 23 states a conclusion that computers as well as all related hardware need to be 
seized in order to allow a computer expert to examine the information contained on the 
computer. R. 271 (addendum B). Additionally, this paragraph provides irrelevant information as 
discussed above. A review of the conclusions and irrelevant information in this paragraph fail to 
give the magistrate any facts to make a common sense determination that probable cause to 
believe a crime has been committed and that evidence of that crime would be located at either 
one of the locations. 
Conclusory statements give a magistrate virtually no basis at all for making a judgment 
regarding probable cause. Id The conclusions in the paragraphs detailed above did not provide 
the magistrate with the necessary information to make an appropriate finding that probable cause 
existed to believe evidence of a crime would be found at either Mr. Norris' home or his place of 
business. Furthermore, these conclusory paragraphs failed to establish sufficient facts to allow a 
19 
magistrate to make an independent conclusion that Mr. Norris and his businesses were so 
pervaded with fraud that an all records search warrant was necessary. 
C. A totality of the circumstances review of the affidavit includes consideration of the 
basis of knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information. 
"The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, commonsense decision 
whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the 
'veracity' and 4basis of knowledge' of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair 
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. Id. 
(emphasis added). 
Although the Supreme Court adopted the totality of the circumstances test, an evaluation 
of the basis of knowledge and veracity of individuals supplying information for the affidavit are 
important components of the analysis. Id. In discussing the basis of knowledge, the Supreme 
Court stated, 
The magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances from 
which the informant concluded that the narcotics were where he claimed they 
were, and some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded 
that the informant, whose identity need not be disclosed was credible or his 
information reliable. Otherwise, the inferences from the facts which lead to Ihe 
complaint will be drawn not by a neutral and detached magistrate, as the 
Constitution requires, but instead, by a police officer engaged in the often 
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. 
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114-15, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 1514 (1964) (citations omitted). In 
applying this concept to the case, the Court noted, "the affidavit here not only contains no 
affirmative allegation that the affiant spoke with personal knowledge of matters contained 
therein, it does not even contain an affirmative allegation that the affiant's unidentified source 
spoke with personal knowledge." Id 378 U.S. at 113, 84 S.Ct. at 1513. 
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Similar problems were pointed out in Spinelli v. U.S.. 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584 (1969). 
In Spinelli, the Court noted that there was not a sufficient statement of the underlying 
circumstances from which an informant concluded the defendant was involved in criminal 
activity. 393 U.S. at 416, 84 S.Ct. at 589. In discussing why the underlying circumstances were 
insufficient, the Court points out that the we are not told how the informant received his 
information nor if the informant personally observed the activity the police officer claimed that 
he observed. IdL Without knowing how an individual providing information for the affidavit 
received the information and without knowing why that information should be relied on, a 
magistrate simply cannot form an independent conclusion about the reliability of the information. 
Paragraphs 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17,18, 19, 20 and 21 fail to state where the information 
contained in those paragraphs came from and the basis of knowledge of the allegations contained 
in those paragraphs. These paragraphs fail to establish sufficient objective facts to allow the 
magistrate to draw her own conclusion about alleged criminal activity and the likelihood that 
evidence of that criminal activity would be found at Mr. Norris' home or business. Therefore, 
after a practical common sense review of the affidavit, there is no substantial basis to conclude 
probable cause existed. Gates, 462 U.S. at 239, 103 S.Ct. at 2333. 
Paragraph 10 in addition to being conclusory, fails to state the source of this information. 
R. 10 (addendum B). Without knowing the source of information or how the source obtained the 
information the magistrate is placed in a position to try a make a common sense determination 
without knowing anything about the veracity of the source of the information or the basis of 
knowledge. Without knowing anything about the veracity and basis, the magistrate is not 
21 
presented the totality of the circumstances and is unable to make a reasonable determination of 
probable cause. 
Paragraph 11 suffers from the same deficiency as paragraph 10, in that it is conclusory 
and fails to identify where the information came from and the basis of knowledge. R. 282 
(addendum B). Failing to identify this critical information for the magistrate and setting the facts 
out in an objective fashion makes it impossible for the magistrate to use this information to 
conclude probable cause of a crime existed and that evidence of the crime could be found at Mr. 
Norris' home and business. 
In paragraph 13 the majority of the information appears to come from the text of a 
promissory note. R. 281 (addendum B). Conspicuously absent from the reference to the 
promissory note is the date of the note, the identification of the parties signing the note, and any 
other details that might identify the note. 
The last two sentences of paragraph 13 allege that although the promissory note 
established attorney fees at $2,000, Mr. Norris really only expended $200 in attorney fees. R. 281 
(addendum B). This information is provided by a "former employee." As in paragraphs 10 and 
11 the affidavit fails to establish who provided this information and how that person knows this 
information and why it should be relied on by a neutral magistrate to conclude that it is evidence 
of a crime. 
Paragraph 14, in addition to drawing conclusions from apparent interviews, fails to state 
once again where the information came from and what the basis of knowledge is. R. 281 
(addendum B). Agent Barton appears to base the information in this paragraph on interviews he 
conducted himself (with whom we do not know) and written reports of interviews (again with 
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whom we do not know) by other law enforcement officers. R. 281 (addendum B). The problem 
begins to be compounded as hearsay is stacked on hearsay, and we still have no idea who is 
providing this information, if they are credible sources of information and how they came to 
learn this information. 
Paragraphs 15 throughl9 continue the pattern over and over again of drawing conclusions 
and failing to state where the information stated comes from and how the source of information 
knows what is stated in the paragraph. R. 279-80 (addendum B). 
In the entire affidavit, the only time we are informed of where the information comes 
from, other than those paragraphs relating to a vague promissory note, are paragraphs 20 and 21 
and all their sub-parts. R. 271-79 (addendum B). Arguably, paragraphs 20 and 21 are the only 
paragraphs in the entire affidavit that provide sufficient information to allow a magistrate to 
make any conclusions at all. 
Paragraph 20 and it's sub-parts stem from an interview of a former employee of Mr. 
Norris', Karen Nolan, who worked for him for approximately six months. R. 279 (addendum B). 
Although much of the information set out in paragraph 20 and it's sub-parts comes from an 
interview with Ms. Nolan, instead of simply stating what Ms. Nolan saw, heard or said, the 
affidavit borders on conclusion in the manner it sets out the substance of the interview with Ms. 
Nolan. For example, sub-paragraph a, instead of stating how Ms. Nolan knew that Mr. Norris 
obtained judgments in Florida and then had them registered in Utah, the affidavit states in 
conclusory fashion simply that Mr. Norris did these things. R. 278 (addendum B). This is a 
conclusion that should be made by a neutral magistrate after observing the objective facts, not by 
the administrative officer seeking the search warrant. 
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Sub-paragraph b, fails to state Ms. Nolan's basis of knowledge for knowing that Mr. 
Norris did not spend $350 in attorney fees for his attorney in Florida. R. 278 (addendum B). How 
Ms. Nolan knows this information is important in order for the magistrate to make a proper 
evaluation of the weight to give it. Moreover, neither sub-paragraphs a or b provide information 
that would lead a magistrate to believe a crime has been committed and that evidence of that 
crime is likely to be found at Mr. Norris' home or business. 
The remaining sub-paragraphs of paragraph 20 contain somewhat vague statements from 
Ms. Nolan's interview, sprinkled with conclusions and a persistent omission of Ms. Nolan's 
basis of knowledge. R. 275-78 (addendum B). A common sense review of paragraph 20 would 
not lead a court to conclude that the magistrate had a substantial basis for believing a crime had 
been committed and that evidence of that crime would be found at the locations lawr enforcement 
desired to search. 
Paragraph 21 sets forth information gleaned by the affiant, Agent Barton, from several 
interviews conducted by another investigator with another former employee, Suzanne DeHerrera. 
R. 274-75 (addendum B). These sub-paragraphs appear to suffer from many of the same 
problems previously noted. The most prevalent deficiency appears to be a lack of a statement of 
Ms. DeHerrera's basis for knowing the information alleged in the sub-paragraphs in addition to 
sporadic conclusory statements. 
Sub-paragraphs d through f and h through j fail to state the basis of knowledge and 
contain conclusory statements. R. 271-74 (addendum B). For example, sub-paragraph d alleges a 
system of mailing notices to Pennsylvania where the notices are then redistributed and mailed 
back to Utah with a Pennsylvania postmark. R. 274 (addendum B). The question that 
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immediately comes to mind is, "how does Ms. DeHerrera know this?" The affidavit fails to 
demonstrate how Ms. DeHerrera knows this information, therefore, it is very difficult to make an 
informed determination of how credible this information is. 
Other examples of problematic statements are found in sub-paragraphs i and j . In those 
paragraphs there are allegations that Mr. Norris maintains a computer back-up as well as other 
business records and audio tapes at his home. R. 271-71 (addendum B). However, once again the 
question that immediately arises is, "how does Ms. DeHerrera know this?" There is absolutely no 
statement anywhere in the affidavit indicating that Ms. DeHerrera has ever been inside of Mr. 
Norris' home or has any other reason to know what can be found in his private residence. What 
makes these two paragraphs even more disturbing is that they seem to be the only two paragraphs 
in the entire affidavit on which law enforcement officers attempt to justify a search of Mr. 
Norris' home. 
Finally, paragraph 24 simply sets out the exhaustive list of items law enforcement sought 
to seize and already discussed above in Mr. Norris' argument that the search warrant was over 
broad. R. 267-71 (addendum B). These paragraphs simply detail the State's wish list of items 
they wanted to seize. These paragraphs do not add anything of substance that would assist a 
magistrate in making a probable cause determination and are therefore irrelevant as discussed 
above. 
This affidavit is saturated with deficiencies. In reviewing this affidavit in a common sense 
fashion and considering the deficiencies, it is clear that a magistrate could not have had a 
substantial basis to conclude that probable cause existed to issue this search warrant. Even giving 
this affidavit the benefit of the doubt it, is questionable whether a magistrate had a substantial 
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basis to issue even a narrowly tailored search warrant seeking specific items of alleged 
contraband. Clearly, given the questionable nature of the affidavit there is no way a magistrate 
could have concluded, from the information presented, that every aspect of Mr. Norris' business 
and personal life were so pervaded with fraud that an all records search warrant, which is 
unprecedented in Utah, was necessary. 
D. The magistrate failed to make a specific finding, based on the affidavit, that Mr. 
Norris' business and personal life were so permeated with fraud that an all records 
search warrant was necessary. 
The State argues that Mr. Norris' business was a sophisticated and pervasive scheme to 
defraud which necessitated the search of all business records to enable investigators to expose the 
fraud in its entirety. In its argument, the State asks this court to do what the magistrate failed to 
do in issuing the warrant in question, that is, to make a probable cause finding to justify the over 
broad reach of the warrant. In short, the State asks this Court to, in a legal sense, shut the gate 
after the horses have run off. 
The duty of the magistrate is to limit warrants to within constitutional limits and avoid, 
"general warrants whereby administrative officers determine what is and what is not to be seized. 
The decision to seize must be judicial, as opposed to administrative, and the warrant must be 
sufficiently particular to guide the officer to the thing intended to be seized, thereby minimizing 
the danger of unwarranted invasion of privacy." Gallegos, 712 P.2d at 209 (emphasis added). 
The warrants in both Voss and Learv suffered from the exact same deficiency as the 
present warrant, over breadth. 774 F.2d 402; 846 F.2d 592. In both Voss and Learv, the courts 
were careful to point out that search warrants allowing the seizure of all the records of a 
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particular business might be constitutionally valid. Voss, 774 F.2d at 406; Learv, 846 F.2d at 
600. In fact, the Tenth Circuit pointed out in Voss, 
Where a warrant authorizes the seizure of particularly described records relevant 
to a specific crime and all of an organization's records, in fact, fall into that 
category, they may all lawfully be seized. However, a warrant that simply 
authorizes the seizure of all files, whether or not relevant to a specified crime, is 
insufficiently particular. 
774 F.2d at 406. 
This concept was implemented by the Tenth Circuit in U.S. v. Hargus J 28 F.3d 1358 
(10th Cir. 1997). In Hargus, the Tenth Circuit upheld a very broad search warrant stating, "we are 
satisfied that it (the warrant) is sufficiently limited and specific, in view of the nature of this 
extended conspiracy . . . to 'allow the executing officers to distinguish between items that may 
and may not be seized.'" 128 F.3d at 1362-63 (citations omitted) (parenthetical added). 
Mr. Norris' case is distinguishable from Hargus because in Hargus there was a much 
more detailed affidavit in support of the broad search warrant. In discussing the affidavit the 
Tenth Circuit stated, 
The affidavit recited the sting operation (which involved a law enforcement 
officer who sold stolen oil to the defendant and recorded the transaction by use of 
a body transmitter) in which Mr. Hargus bought stolen oil at his reclaiming yard; 
it described the conspiracy between Hargus, Johnson, and Dice; and it described 
oil transfer reports and daily time sheets provided to the affiant by Mr. Johnson 
and his employer, indicating that the trafficking in stolen oil had been going on 
for at least three months. In our view these facts alone establish probable cause for 
the warrant. 
Id. 128 F.3d at 1362 (parenthetical added). The affidavit in the Hargus case provided much more 
specific and detailed information than the affidavit in our current case. Unlike our case, much of 
the information in the affidavit was gathered first hand by a law enforcement officer, for 
27 
example, the law enforcement officer participated personally in the illicit transaction. Id. 128 
F.3d at 1360-61. In considering the strong, detailed and specific statements set out in the 
affidavit in Hargus, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the list of items sought by the search 
warrant, (which is dwarfed by the length and shear number of items sought by the warrant in the 
present case), was sufficiently limited to allow administrative officers to distinguish between 
what to seize and what not to seize. 128 F.3d atl362-63. 
While a magistrate may find probable cause to issue a properly restricted search warrant, 
she must make the additional specific probable cause finding, based on the evidence before it, 
"that fraud pervaded every aspect" of the business. Voss, 774 F.2d at 406. Absent that specific 
finding, warrants allowing for the "rummaging through all the business records" are 
constitutionally prohibited. 
The question is not, as the State suggests, "Could a magistrate have possibly made a 
probable cause finding that Mr. Norris' business was an "instrumentality of fraud?" The relevant 
question is, "Did the magistrate make that specific probable cause finding?" In Voss, Leary, and 
this case, the magistrate did not, making the warrants overbroad, general warrants. 
A finding that the magistrate simply could have found probable cause would render 
meaningless the Fourth Amendment's probable cause requirement mandating a finding of 
probable cause prior to issuing a warrant. State v. Purser, 828 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah App.1992) 
(It is well settled that before issuing a search warrant, a neutral magistrate must review an 
affidavit containing specific facts sufficient to support a finding of probable cause). The 
necessity of a finding of probable cause, by a detached, neutral magistrate, is to prevent illegal 
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searches. Justification after the fact would abrogate the warrant requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 
E. The search warrant was based on stale information. 
The Supreme Court has long recognized that for probable cause information to support 
the issuance of a search warrant, "the proof must be of facts so closely related to the time of the 
issue of the warrant as to justify a finding of probable cause at that time." SRO v. United States, 
287 U.S. 206, 210 (1932). There is no bright line rule regarding the passing of a certain amount 
of time to resolve staleness issues. Instead, in determining staleness problems courts should focus 
on the nature of the particular crime or crimes the probable cause information is alleged to 
establish. 
In United States v. Redistill 987 F.2d 1383, 1391 (8th Cir. 1993), the court held that a 
five month delay to obtain notes in the defendant's office was too long. Likewise, in United 
States v. Neal 500 F.2d 305, 309 (10th Cir. 1974), the court ruled that a three to five month delay 
regarding information about stolen auto parts could not provide probable cause in support of the 
warrant. See also. Re: Grand Jury Proceeding, 716 F.2d at 498-99 (warrant seeking the seizure of 
records of a business from 1976 to 1983 was held to be an invalid general warrant as the alleged 
crime took place only in the later part of that time period). 
In this case, the state relied upon statements made by two of Mr. Norris' former 
employees. Paragraph 20 of the affidavit discusses information provided by Ms. Nolan. Ms. 
Nolan worked from October 1995 to March of 1996. R. 279 (addendum B). By the time the 
warrant was signed and executed, in early April of 1997, it had been more than a year since Ms. 
Nolan worked for Mr. Norris. 
29 
The affidavit also relies on information provided by Ms. DeHerrera which is discussed in 
paragraph 21. Ms. DeHerrera worked part-time for Mr. Norris during the single month of 
November 1996. R. 274-75 (addendum B). Ms. DeHerrera left Mr. Norris' employment some six 
months before the execution of the search warrant. 
This stale information, provided by Ms. Nolan and Ms. DeHerrera, covers eight pages of 
the twenty-one page affidavit. 
The affiant, Agent Barton, indicates that he relied on a personal review of documents and 
interviews conducted by two other investigators. R. 281-82 (addendum B). For example, the 
affiant discusses promissory notes that he has reviewed that contained certain, "confession of 
judgment" provisions that permitted Mr. Norris to sue in Pennsylvania. R. 281-82 (addendum B). 
Nowhere does the affiant indicate the date of those promissory notes, when lawsuits were filed or 
any other information that would place the documents into a time context relative to the timing 
of the search warrant. 
The same problem comes up with the interviews conducted by the other investigators. 
The affiant did not disclose when those interviews were conducted, so there is no way to 
determine if the interviews occurred days before the magistrate reviewed the affidavit and signed 
the warrant or months or years earlier. R. 281 (addendum B). Moreover, even if the interviews 
had been conducted just prior to the issuance of the warrant, there is insufficient information to 
determine when Mr. Norris' alleged conduct occurred in relation to the issuance of the warrant. 
The alleged conduct could have happened a few months before the affiant swore out the affidavit 
or years earlier. 
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The affidavit either provides stale information in support of probable cause or is simply 
silent as to facts that would place the information into a time context relative to the issuance the 
search warrant. The staleness of the information and the lack of a time reference compound the 
already significant problems in the affidavit. In considering all of the deficiencies of the affidavit, 
there is no substantial basis in the affidavit to establish probable cause to support a search 
warrant. 
F. Expunged information should not have been included in the affidavit in support of 
the search warrant. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-9(5) (1999) defines expungement as, "the sealing or destruction 
of a criminal record, including records of the investigation, arrest, detention, or conviction of the 
petitioner." One effect of an expungement is the record becomes sealed information contained in 
that record may not be used against Mr. Norris. "The persons who have access to sealed record or 
whose testimony is bolstered by reference to it cannot be allowed to 'recreate' the record in 
proceedings subsequent to the expungement." Ambus v. Utah State Board of Education, 800 
P.2d 811,813 (1990). Likewise, "once the police department received the expungement order, 
employees of the department could not then testify concerning information contained in the 
expunged record." Ambus v. Granite Board of Education, 975 F.2d 1555, 1567 (10th Cir. 1992). 
In the present case, information contained in the affidavit to support the warrant was 
obtained through records included in the arrest and investigation of Mr. Norris on charges 
dismissed December 10, 1996 and subsequently expunged. Specifically, the affidavit contains 
allegations from two former employees, Ms. Nolan and Ms. DeHerrera, who testified during the 
expunged action. As the information received by the two former employees was subject to the 
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expungement order, the use of the testimony should not be allowed under the rule set forth above 
concerning use of expunged information in subsequent proceedings. 
III. THE AFFIDAVIT AND ACTUAL SEARCH WARRANT ARE SO INADEQUATE 
THAT NO REASONABLE OFFICER COULD RELY ON THEM, THEREFORE, THE 
LEON GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION DOES NOT APPLY TO THIS CASE. 
A. The good faith exception does not apply when the warrant is based on an affidavit 
so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence 
entirely unreasonable. 
The State is correct that under current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence the good faith 
exception articulated in U.S. v. Leon. 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405 (1984), can save an 
otherwise technically deficient warrant by application of the "good faith" exception. In Leon the 
United States Supreme Court held that because the exclusionary rule is meant to deter police 
misconduct, evidence obtained by officers action in objective good faith reliance on the legality 
of a warrant is admissible even though the warrant is later found to be invalid. 468 U.S. at 920-
23. 
The Leon court outlined four situations that would make the "good faith" exception 
inapplicable: 1) the magistrate was misled by false information in the affidavit, 2) the magistrate 
abandoned a neutral, detached, judicial role, 3)the warrant was facially deficient in describing the 
place to be searched or the things to be seized, and 4) the warrant is based on an affidavit so 
lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely 
unreasonable. Id, 468 U.S. at 923; State v. Droneburg. 781 P.2d 1303 (Ut. App. 1989). 
The affidavit in this case is an example of a probable cause assertion that is so lacking in 
substance that the officer executing the warrant could not have reasonably and objectively relied 
upon it, notwithstanding the magistrate's issuance of the warrant. 
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As discussed above, the affidavit in this case has multiple and serious deficiencies. After 
wading through twenty-one pages of conclusions, statements failing to identify the basis of 
knowledge (not to mention statements involving multiple levels of hearsay) and statements of 
stale information it is clear that an officer executing the warrant could not have reasonably and 
objectively relied upon it. 
The affidavit is so demonstrably deficient in its attempt to establish probable cause, the 
executing officer's reliance on the warrant was not objectively reasonable nor did the officer act 
in food faith reliance on the magistrate's determination. As the Utah Court of Appeals stated, 
"when the magistrate receiving the affidavit in support of the search warrant is not presented with 
sufficient facts to determine probable cause, the warrant cannot be relied upon by searching 
officers." State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730, 738 (Ut. App. 1991). The affidavit in this case presents at 
least one of the four situations noted by the Leon court where the "good faith" exception should 
not be applied. 
B. The good faith exception is inapplicable to a facially over broad search warrant. 
When a warrant is so facially deficient in its description of the items to be seized that an 
officer could not reasonably rely on it, the good faith exception is inapplicable. Leary, 846 F.2d 
at 609; see also, United States v. Spilotro. 800 F.2d 959, 961 (9th Cir. 1986)(good faith exception 
is inapplicable to facially over broad warrant). 
As detailed above in the first section of this argument, the search warrant in this case was, 
without doubt, facially over broad. The overbroad scope authorized by the warrant in this case is 
so extreme that an executing officer could not have reasonably relied on the warrant. Therefore, 
the good faith exception does not apply and will not save this search warrant. 
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IV. NO GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION IS RECOGNIZED UNDER ARTICLE I, 
SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
A state court may interpret its own constitution in a manner different from the United 
States Supreme Court's interpretation of a similar federal provision so long as it does not reach a 
result providing citizens with less rights than those guaranteed by the Constitution of the United 
States. Fox Film Corp. v. Mullen 296 U.S. 207, 210, 56 S.Ct. 183, 184 (1935); Herb v. Pitcairn. 
324 U.S. 117,125-26, 65 S.Ct. 459, 463 (1945); Jankovich v. Indiana Toll Road Comm.. 379 
U.S. 487, 489, 85 S.Ct. 493, 494 (1965); Malan v. Lewis. 693 P.2d 661, 670 (Utah 1984). 
On several occasions Utah's highest court has shown a willingness to make substantive 
law based solely on the Utah Constitution. See e.g., American Fork City v. Cosgrove. 701 P.2d 
1069 (Utah 1989) (scope of privilege against self-incrimination); Malan v. Lewis. 693 P.2d 661 
(Utah 1984) (automobile guest statute); State v. Ball 685 P.2d 515 (Utah 1984) (questioning a 
juror about drinking alcohol); Gray v. Employment Security. 681 P.2d 807 (Utah 1987) 
(Durham, J. concurring and dissenting, due process in re: unemployment benefits); State v. 
Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990) (automobile exception to search warrant); State v. 
Thompson. 810 P.2d 415 (Utah 1991) (exception of privacy in bank records): Zissi v. State Tax 
Commission of Utah. 842 P.2d 848 (Utah 1992) (Utah Constitutional exclusionary rule prevents 
admission of illegally seized evidence at commission hearing). On other occasions the Court has 
suggested it is inviting argument specifically on Utah Constitution Article I, Section 14. State v. 
Hygh. 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985); State v. Earl. 716 P.2d 803 (Utah 1986); State v. Watts. 750 
P.2d 1219 (Utah 1988); Durham, Employing the Utah Constitution. 2 Utah Bar Journal 25 (Nov. 
1989). 
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It is clear that Utah's appellate courts have the authority to interpret Utah's constitutional 
search and seizure provision differently than the corresponding federal provision. The Utah 
Supreme Court has invited discussion of Utah Constitutional principles, has established a history 
of reaching them and has developed Utah Constitutional law in variance with federal law. In this 
context, it is proper for this Court to consider an interpretation of the Utah Constitution which 
may be different from the federal constitutional holding. 
Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah is this State's equivalent of the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution's prohibition against unreasonable searches and 
seizures. The Utah Supreme Court has held that an exclusionary rule does apply to violations of 
Article I, Section 14. Larocco, 794 P.2d at 472; Thompson. 810 P.2d at 419. However, it does 
not appear that Utah appellate courts have decided whether a good faith exception similar to the 
one set out in United States v. Leon, is applicable to violations of Article I, Section 14. Larocco, 
764 P.2d at 473; Thompson, 810 P.2d at 420; Sims v. Utah State Tax Commission. 841 P.2d 6, 
11 (Utah 1992), n. 10. 
Mr. Norris argues that no such "good faith" exception should save an improperly issued 
search warrant from the effect of the Utah constitutional exclusionary rule. At least one Utah 
appellate judge has opined that, "a healthy skepticism should permeate the court's consideration 
[of a good faith exception to Article I, Section 14] in view of the troublesome analysis in Leon." 
Rowe, 806 P.2d at 743 (appendix to opinion) (brackets added). The Supreme Court noted on one 
occasion, without comment, that Connecticut has found a good faith exception incompatible with 
its constitution. Thompson, 810 P.2d at 420, n. 4. On another occasion the Court noted that 
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several states have rejected a Leon-type invalid warrant exception in relation to their own 
constitutions. Sims 841 P.2d at 11, n.10 &11. 
States that have expressly rejected a good faith exception to their state constitutions are as 
follows: New York, People v. Bigelow, 488 N.E.2d 451 (N.Y. 1985) (exclusionary rule's 
purpose would be frustrated, a premium would be placed on illegal police action, would create 
incentive to others to act illegally); Michigan, People v. Sundling, 395 N.W.2nd 308 (Mich. App. 
1986) (exclusionary rule in its present form is necessary to preservation of right to be free from 
unreasonable government intrusion); New Jersey, State v. Novembrino, 519 A.2d 820 (N.J. 
1987) (would undermine police motivation to comply with constitutional requirement of 
probable cause, would diminish quality of evidence presented in search warrant applications); 
North Carolina, State v .Carter, 370 S.E.2d 553 (N.C. 1988) (judicial integrity demands 
suppression of illegally obtained evidence); Connecticut, State v. Marsala, 579 A.2d 58 (Conn. 
1990) (would discourage thorough police work, would encourage reviewing courts to simply 
look for good faith instead of reviewing the probable cause requirement); Pennsylvania, 
Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Perm. 1991) (would clash with strong right of 
privacy guaranteed in the Pennsylvania Constitution); Vermont, State v. Oakes, 598 A.2d 119 
(Vt. 1991) (Vermont is not persuaded that the cost/benefit analysis of Leon is accurate); Idaho, 
State v. Guzman, 842 P.2d 660 (Id. 1991) ("we finally and unequivocally no longer adhere to a 
policy of sheepishly following in the footsteps of the U.S. Supreme Court in the area of state 
constitutional analysis." The good faith exception is ill conceived); New Mexico, State v. 
Gutierrez, 863 P.2d 1052 (N.M. 1993) (incompatible with the New Mexico Constitution). 
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Gutierrez is especially instructive in its reasoning for rejecting a "good faith" exception to 
invalid warrants. The New Mexico Supreme Court, noting that a divergence of opinions existed 
nationwide in the developing cases both prior to and contemporary with the framing of the New 
Mexico Constitution in 1910 (ratified in 1911) with regard to exclusionary rules as a means to 
implement rights against unreasonable searches and seizures, concluded that it was impossible to 
precisely determine the New Mexico framers' intent regarding an exclusionary rule or a "good 
faith" exception; rather, the Court determined, "that the framers were aware of the controversy 
and left interpretation to the courts rather than address the exclusion issue in the constitution." Id. 
863 P.2d at 1065. The Gutierrez court held that a "good faith" exception was incompatible with 
the New Mexico Constitution's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, (New 
Mexico's constitutional provision is substantially similar to Utah's). 863 P.2d at 1068. The Court 
held: 
The approach we adopt today focuses not on deterrence or judicial integrity, nor 
do we propose a judicial remedy; instead, our focus is to effectuate in the pending 
case the constitutional right of the accused to be free from unreasonable search 
and seizure . . . If, after consideration of the substantive constitutional issue, the 
court decides that the state has transgressed the constitutional rights of a person 
accused of a crime, we will not sanction that conduct by turning the other cheek. 
The basis we articulate today for the exclusionary rule in this state - to effectuate 
the constitutional right in the pending case - is incompatible with any exception 
based on the good faith reliance of the officer on the magistrate's determination 
either of probable cause or of the reasonableness of the search. 
Id 863 P.2d at 1067-68. 
The reasoning of the states that have rejected the good faith exception for their own 
constitutions is compelling. Utah should not undermine the integrity of the judiciary, emasculate 
Article I, Section 14, encourage sloppy police work or encourage lazy magisterial, trial and 
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appellate court review by adopting a good faith exception to the State's constitution. Rather, as 
with Gutierrez, Utah courts should recognize that the right of an accused to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizure should be implemented by a rule that holds illegally gained 
evidence inadmissable, regardless of the good faith of the searching officer. 
Further, when viewed in the historical context of its origination, Article I, Section 14 of 
the Constitution of Utah can be seen as having an application different than that of the similar 
provision of the United States Constitution. 
It is generally recognized the original (non-native) settlers of this state, members of the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints or Mormons, a close and self sufficient society, 
suffered from organized persecution that was not held in check (and quite probably was 
encouraged) by three separate state governments. They undertook an arduous mass migration 
over great distances to both avoid the persecution and maintain their religious-based society. 
Once they arrived here they were made the further target of almost fifty years of federal pressure 
because of the United States Congress' disapproval of their belief in polygamy. 
In this setting, for the fifty years immediately preceding acceptance into the union, 
several attempts were made at drafting a state constitution that would placate Congress. The 
seventh draft, prohibiting polygamy, finally secured statehood. The development of the State's 
present constitution and the intent of its various provisions, cannot be assessed without an 
appreciation of these dynamics. 
Article I, Section 14 (prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures) was drafted 
by a people who thrice were not protected by their local governments from mob violence, who 
fled to a place of total isolation from other societies and all governments, who endured ridicule 
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and systematic federal prosecution of their membership as well as their leaders for their religious 
belief (the evidence for such prosecutions - plural wives and co-habitants - being harbored in 
their private homes), who maintained a public disagreement with the federal government for five 
decades, and who were forced to suffer public humiliation before acceptance by the federal 
government, would not have taken lightly the intrusion of those governments into their persons, 
houses, papers and effects. K. Wallentine, Heeding the Call: Search and Seizure Jurisprudence 
Under the Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 14, 17 L. Contemp. L. 267, 276-281 (1991). 
Unlike the framers of the United States Constitution, the framers of the Constitution of 
Utah were drafting a constitution with the goal of joining the government that had oppressed it 
rather than leaving the oppressive governing body. Article I, Section 14 is a reflection of the 
people's feelings of hostility and distrust of a government perceived as inimical to their beliefs if 
not their existence. 
While the people's leaders had the federal text as a model for this section, they were also 
personally targets of federal polygamy prosecutions. Firmage, Religion and the Law: The 
Mormon Experience in the Nineteenth Century. 12 Cardozo Law Review 765, 771-78 (1991). 
Consequently, the drafters of the various attempts at a state constitution very likely personally 
experienced searches of their homes and effects in conjunction with Morrill and Edmunds 
investigations and prosecutions. See, Bradley, Hide and Seek: Children of the Underground, 51 
Utah Historical Quarterly 133 (1983) (recounting how a polygamist's home was searched 100 
times in a four year period); "How They Do It," Deseret News Weekly, January 20, 1886 at 1 
(explaining how federal marshals entered a polygamist's home without a warrant and by 
breaking the door with and axe); Ivans, A Constitution for Utah. 25 Utah Historical Quarterly 95, 
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100 (1957); White, The Making of the Convention of President: The Political Education of John 
Henry Smith. 39 Utah Historical Quarterly 351, 357 (1971) (detailing how John H. Smith, a 
Mormon Apostle and President of the constitutional convention of 1895 practiced polygamy and 
had been the target of federal marshals' searches); Wallentine, at 279-80 ("Drafters of Utah's 
early constitutions were intimately familiar with egregious searches of the sort unknown since 
the days of King George... . Several members of the subcommittee selected to draft the 
declaration of rights . . . had publicly protested search and seizure practices of federal 
marshals."). 
The totality of this societal and constitutional history of Utah, therefore, strongly suggest 
a heightened appreciation and valuation of the privacy rights in personal effects - particularly 
one's home - based on personal experience with and strong distrust of governmental intrusion. 
From this history it is unlikely that the Utah Constitutional framers would have accepted the 
concept that illegally gained evidence should be used against a citizen because the seizing officer 
acted in "good faith." 
The appellate courts of Utah have not recognized nor articulated a "good faith" exception 
founded in the Utah Constitution. Sister states have recognized the folly of such an exception. 
The history of the origination of Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution suggest that its drafters 
did not envision that the "good faith" of the executive branch of government should be the basis 
for protection of constitutional rights. 
No good faith exception currently exists under the Utah Constitution. If the search 
warrant in this case is constitutionally inadequate the exclusionary rule as articulated by the Utah 
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appellate courts is the adequate remedy and no good faith exception should redeem the deficient 
search warrant. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the arguments and authorities above, Mr. Norris respectfully requests that this 
Court affirm the decision of the trial judge and suppress the evidence seized pursuant to the 
constitutionally inadequate search warrant. 
SUBMITTED this 2%_ day of April, 2001. 
JARED W. ELDRID^ 
Attorney for Appellee/Defendant 
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Addenda 
Addendum A 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, DIVISION II 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SEARCH WARRANT 
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER IN THE STATE OF UTAH: 
Proof by Affidavit under oath having been made this day 
before me by Lt. Ronald C. Barton, I am satisfied that there is 
probable cause to believe that 
(X) on the premises described as 
(Site #1) And (Site #2) 
4440 Christopherson Dr. #B 3392 West 3500 South 
West Valley City, UT West Valley City, UT 
further described as: (Site #1): a two-story duplex, with tan 
brick and white siding and a brown screen door. Including a 
detached two-car garage and a metal storage shed behind the 
duplex. The duplex is located on the west side of Christopherson 
Drive and Unit B is located on the right (north) half of the 
building. (Site #2) : a single-story building located in an 
office area North of 3500 South at 3392 West, the building is 
part of complex of several similar buildings in a 
commercial/industrial area, it has a glass front and the entire 
row of buildings has a green roof extension over the front of the 
offices. The entrance is on the east side of the building, 
facing the parking area. No company name is located on the 
building, and the company address of 3392 is located above the 
entrance door. 
in the City of West Valley, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, 
there is now being possessed or concealed certain property or 
evidence described as: 
Documents relating to the business activities of 
RICHARD FRANKLIN NORRIS and EMILIO CORTEZ# operating as 
MAXTRON CORP. (formerly ALTA PUBLISHING), SAKTOS 
INTERNATIONAL, and UNITED INVESTORS CREDIT SERVICES, 
INC. 
These documents and computer files are more fully described 
on Exhibit "A" attached hereto. 
And that the above-described property or evidence; 
( ) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully 
possessed; 
(X) has been used to commit or conceal a public 
offense; 
(X) is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a 
means of committing or concealing a public offense; 
(X) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of 
illegal conduct, possessed by a party to the 
illegal conduct; 
YOU ARE THEREFORE COMMANDED: 
(X) at any time during the daytime to make a search of the 
above-described premises for the above-described property or 
evidence, and if you find the same or any part thereof, to 
bring it forthwith before me at the Third District Court, 
County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, OR to retain such 
property in your custody, subject to the order of this 
Court• 
, & ^ 
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND and date; 
1997. 
)URT
 SHEILA ICMcCLEVE 
EXHIBIT "A" TO THE AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
Documents relating to the business activities of RICHARD 
FRANKLIN NORRIS and EMILIO CORTEZ, operating as MAXTRON CORP. 
(formerly ALTA PUBLISHING) , SANTOS INTERNATIONAL, and UNITED 
INVESTORS CREDIT SERVICES, INC. 
These documents are more particularly described as follows: 
A) Records in whatever form of contacts with customers 
and clients of MAXTRON CORP (formerly ALTA PUBLISHING); SANTOS 
INTERNATIONAL; and UNITED INVESTORS CREDIT SERVICES, INC., 
including mailings, receipt of funds, and inquiries• 
B) Banking records, accounting records, check registers, 
deposit slips, money order receipts, receipts for cashiers 
checks, cashiers checks, records of wire transfers in whatever 
form showing the source and application of funds received from or 
transferred to persons and/or entities. 
C) Records in whatever form relating to mailing and 
receipt of parcels and packages whether U. S. Mail or other 
common carrier. 
D) Safes, indicia of safe deposit boxes, storage 
facilities or similar devices used for storage of records or 
belongings and applications for mail drop boxes. 
E) Promotional materials in whatever form showing the 
information provided to customers and the initial solicitation, 
including copies of promissory notes and/or advertising 
contracts. Copies of any video and/or audio tapes. 
F) Copies of any and all general correspondence and 
business records including: client statements; client 
contracts and/or proposals; subcontract agreements and/or 
contracts; materials describing company concepts; audio/visual 
materials; invoices for the purchase of or services performed for 
the editing, marketing, drafting or graphic design, printing 
and/or binding of various publications; statements relating to 
vendor accounts; canceled checks; bank statements; ledgers; books 
of accounts; accounting and/or financial records detailing the 
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daily business activity of the companies; personal diaries, 
telephone logs; appointment books; checkbooks, information 
pertaining to safe deposit boxes; records indicating the location 
of assets; warehouse shipping and receiving records; commission 
and payroll records; travel records; employee applications; 
marketing scripts; all corporate books and records; documentation 
of fictitious names used by company officers and employees; 
mailing and/or shipping records for both public and private 
carriers; lease agreements; employment contracts; partnership 
agreements; any and all records which identify or pertain to 
individuals having managerial or supervisory responsibility, 
including, but not limited to, records pertaining to Richard 
Franklin Norris and Emilio Cortez; stock certificates and 
investment records. 
G) Any and all information concerning the subject 
businesses stored in the form of magnetic or electronic coding 
on computer or with the aid of computer-related equipment. These 
media include floppy diskettes, fixed hard disks, removable hard 
disk cartridges, tapes, laser disks, printer buffers, smart 
cards, memory calculators, electronic notebooks, and any other 
media which is capable of storing magnetic coding. Any and all 
electronic devices which are capable of analyzing, creating, 
displaying, converting or transmitting electronic-or magnetic 
computer impulses or data. These devices include computers, 
computer components, computer peripherals, word processing 
equipment, modems, monitors, printers, plotters, encryption 
circuit boards, optical scanners, external hard drives, and any 
other computer related electronic devices. Including operating 
systems, application software, utility programs, compilers, 
interpreters, and other programs or software used to communicate 
with the computer hardware or peripherals either directly or 
indirectly via telephone lines, radio, or other means of 
transmission. 
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Addendum B 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
JUDGE ADDRESS 
RONALD BARTON, the undersigned affiant, being first duly sworn 
upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am a Special Agent for the Utah Attorney General's 
Office, Consumer Rights Division, and have been so employed for 
the past seven years, with prior law enforcement experience of 
thirteen years. I have received training in the investigation of 
fraud and other financial crimes from the Utah Peace Officer 
Standards and Training Academy and the Utah Attorney General's 
Office. 
2. I am currently working with Randy Tuckett, U.S. Postal 
Inspection Service and Kent Nelson, Investigator for the Utah 
Division of Consumer Protection. 
3. Your affiant and the above named investigators have been 
investigating allegations of communications fraud (Utah Code Ann. 
Section 76-10-1801) money laundering (Utah Code Ann. Section 76-
10-1901) and racketeering (Utah Code Ann. Section 76-10-1601). 
4. During the course of my investigation, I have either 
personally interviewed, or reviewed other investigative 
memorandums of interviews, of the following persons: Kevin 
Barkdull, Barkdull Plumbing; Darrell Garrett, Colonial Building 
Supply; Dave Butler, Anderson Lumber; Charles Cole Mast; Bob 
Nielsen, Mountain Fuel Supply; Rees and Yvonne Rasmussen, R & R 
Drywall; Alan Nielson, A-Quality Plumbing & Heating; Joseph Bye, 
Steve Peterson Interiors; Richard Foote, Foote Insurance Agency, 
and former employees, Karen E. Noland and Suzanne DeHerrera. 
5. Based on investigative information, Affiant has reason to 
believe that evidence of criminal conduct may be located: 
(X) on the premises described as 
(Site #1) And (Site #2) 
4440 Christopherson Dr. #B 3392 West 3500 South 
West Valley City, UT West Valley City, UT 
further described as: (Site #1): a two-story duplex, with tan 
brick and white siding and a brown screen door. Including a 
detached two-car garage and a metal storage shed behind the 
duplex. The duplex is located on the west side of Christopherson 
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Drive and Unit B is located on the right (north) half of the 
building. (Site #2) : a single-story building located in an 
office area North of 3500 South at 3392 West, the building is 
part of complex of several similar buildings in a 
commercial/industrial area, it has a glass front and the entire 
row of buildings has a green roof extension over the front of the 
offices. The entrance is on the east side of the building, 
facing the parking area. No company name is- located on the 
building, and the company address of 33 92 is located above the 
entrance door. 
6. This Investigation has revealed that RICHARD NORRIS and 
EMILIO CORTEZ, through various business entities, have engaged in 
a scheme or schemes to defraud others, 
7. My review of corporate records on file with the Utah 
Division of Corporations reveals the following: a) Maxtron Corp. 
("Maxtron") was registered as a foreign corporation 
(Pennsylvania) with the Division on April 5, 1995, with Richard 
Norris listed as Director, President and Registered Agent; b) 
Norris Publishing Company was registered with the Division on 
April 19, 1979, with Richard Norris listed as Director, President 
and Registered Agent; c) LaRoe International was registered with 
the Division on October 5, 1993 as a dba for Norris Publishing, 
listing Norris Publishing as Registered Agent. 
8. On or about December 17, 1996, Investigator Nelson 
contacted the State of Pennsylvania and learned the following 
3 
information: a) Maxtron received a corporate registration on 
January 30, 1995, with Richard Norris listed as the President; 
b) Santos International received a corporate registration on 
January 30, 1995, with Emilio Cortez listed as President; and c) 
United Investors Credit Services, Inc. ("United 
Investors")received a corporate registration on January 31, 1996 
with Peggy Stone listed as President, I have subsequently 
learned that Peggy Stone is the aunt of Richard Norris, 
9. My investigation has revealed that the scheme to defraud 
is currently being executed by Norris and Cortez as officers, 
owners, and/or agents of Maxtron (formerly known as Alta 
Publishing), Santos International, and United Investors through 
the solicitation and sale of advertising in a "marketing" 
brochure ("brochure") which is represented to be published on a 
quarterly basis. 
10. Norris initially approaches general contractors 
("generals") in Utah to solicit their approval of a quarterly 
publication which includes some generic construction inserts and 
advertising of the general's subcontractors ("subs"). He 
represents to the generals that there will be no cost to them 
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cause the costs will be paid in their entirety by the general's 
bs and that the general will receive the brochure on a 
arterly basis for distribution. 
11. Once Norris identifies subs used by the general, he 
ntacts each sub and quotes a cost, including a discount, for 
vertising. Norris advises the subs that their general has 
guested that he contact them. Norris also represents to the 
bs that advertising by the subs will reduce the cost of the 
blication to the general. The contractors are advised by 
rris that the advertising fee entitles them to have an ad in 
ch of the four printings of the brochure. Subs are then asked 
sign a Promissory Note ("note") and Advertising Agreement 
agreement"). 
12. My review of the agreements and notes indicates that the 
tes require the sub to pay the principal amount of the note, 
ss a substantial discount (usually 50%), in equal monthly 
stallments ranging from one to twelve months. The note 
•ecifies the date such payments are to commence, normally within 
drty days following the execution of the contract. The note 
.rther provides that if the sub fails to make any payment when 
5 
due, the holder of the note may require immediate payment of the 
full, undiscounted amount of the note, refer the matter to an 
attorney for collection, and bring suit to recover judgment. 
13. The notes also contain a paragraph which provides for a 
"confession of judgment" pursuant to the laws of the State of 
Pennsylvania. The confession of judgment clause specifies that 
judgment for the full, undiscounted sum of the note, together 
with late fees, court costs, and attorneys fees may be entered 
upon default in any monthly installment. The note also 
establishes that attorney fees "shall be not less or more than 
$2,000." I have been advised by a former employee that only $200 
is paid to attorneys handling defaults on these notes. 
14. Based upon my interviews and my review of interviews 
conducted by Investigator Nelson and Postal Inspector Tuckett, I 
have found that Norris routinely stalls clients into default on 
their notes through various misrepresentations after which he 
exercises the default provisions of the note and executes 
judgments in Pennsylvania pursuant to the confession of judgment 
clause. 
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15. Although the notes make no reference to the printing 
proofs for the subs' advertisements ("proofs"), during 
negotiations and subsequent to the execution of the agreement and 
note, Norris universally represents to the subs that they are not 
required to begin making any payments until they receive and 
approve the proofs. 
16. Within a short time after the execution of the agreement 
and note, subs receive a letter from Santos International 
advising them that Santos International has purchased their note 
from Maxtron. They also receive a letter from Maxtron advising 
them of the sale of their note to Santos International. 
17. Again, shortly after receiving the letter from Santos 
International, contractors receive another letter from Santos 
International stating that Santos International has sold their 
note to United Investors. Shortly after notice from Santos 
International, subs begin receiving notices and statements from 
United Investors demanding payment on the note. 
18. During this time, Norris continues to assure the subs 
that the proofs will arrive shortly and that they are not 
required to pay until they receive the proofs. Norris also 
7 
represents to the subs that he is not affiliated in any way with 
Santos International or United Investors. 
19. Based on the representations of Norris, most of the subs 
have not made payments on the notes as required by the notes 
because they have not yet received the proofs as promised by 
Norris. Consequently, when the payments are not paid as set 
forth in the notes, Cortez and Norris, acting as officers, 
agents, and/or owners of United Investors, exercise the default 
provisions of the notes and execute uncontested judgments in 
Pennsylvania. Norris and Cortez then immediately have the 
judgments docketed as a foreign judgment within the State of Utah 
and proceed to execute upon these judgments by attempting to 
seize vehicles, file liens, garnish wages, etc., upon an 
individual and/or officer of a corporate entity. 
20. During the course of our investigation, Postal Inspector 
Randy Tuckett has conducted several interviews of Karen Noland 
who was employed by Norris as his office manager from 
approximately October 1995 to March 1996. Ms. Noland has 
provided the following information in these interviews: 
8 
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a) During the first three months of her employment, 
Norris operated the business under the name of Alta Publishing 
which maintained a Florida post office box. Accordingly, the 
contracts provided that all actions must be filed in the State of 
Florida. Norris explained to Ms. Noland that the reason he 
required that actions be filed in Florida was that it saved him 
from having to go to court. Ms. Noland typed the necessary court 
documents and forwarded them to an attorney in Florida (five at a 
time) for filing. Norris then received a default judgment in 
most, if not all cases, because the subs did not appear in the 
Florida court. Norris then filed a foreign judgment in Utah in 
order to get a writ of execution and garnish bank accounts or 
property. 
b) The Alta Publishing contracts also provided for 
attorney's fees in the sum of $350.00. However, Norris was not 
required to pay his attorney in Florida $350.00. 
c) For the six months that Ms. Noland worked for Norris, 
only one brochure was actually sent out to her knowledge. 
However, there were files for approximately 6 or 7 magazines, all 
of which were 6 to 8 weeks late for publishing. 
9 
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d) Ms. Noland also made collection calls on behalf of 
Norris. During the course of her work to collect from subs, 
every person she contacted told her that Norris had lied and 
deceived them into purchasing the advertisement. Some indicated 
that Norris had represented that they had 72 hours to cancel but 
after signing the contract they were told it could not be 
canceled. Others indicated that they had never received any 
confirmation that the brochure was published, which, according to 
Ms. Noland, was because they had not been published. 
e) On two occasions Ms. Noland was asked by Norris to 
put together brochures from prior brochures so they could be used 
by Norris in Small Claims Court to show that all brochures had 
been published. 
f) On several occasions, Norris told Ms. Noland that he 
did not mind suing the subs in court because suing the subs on 
the contracts was actually how he made his money. He further 
indicated that the money from advertising barely covered the cost 
of publishing the brochures. 
g) On or about January 1, 1996, Norris began operating 
under the name of Maxtron based out of Pennsylvania. At that 
10 
time, Norris operated three companies out of his West Valley 
office (Site #2), all presumably based in Pennsylvania: Maxtron, 
Santos International, and United Investors. The advertisement 
was sold by Maxtron, and if the account was paid in full, it 
remained with Maxtron. However if the account was set up in 
payments, 99% of which were, it was sold to Santos International 
which was the purported publishing company. The account was then 
immediately sold by Santos International to United Investors 
which was the collections company. 
h) Ms. Noland sent all correspondence from these three 
companies to Pennsylvania for mailing from a Pennsylvania post 
office so that all mail had a Pennsylvania post mark. 
i) In addition, each "Pennsylvania" company had a 
separate Pennsylvania telephone number which was automatically 
forwarded to the West Valley office (Site #2). 
j) Norris told Ms. Noland that the reason for the 
Pennsylvania location of these companies was to take advantage of 
Pennsylvania's "confession of judgment" laws which allowed Norris 
to get a judgment against subs without the necessity of notifying 
them or serving them with any papers. 
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k) When he began the Pennsylvania companies, Norris also 
substantially raised the amount for attorney's fees. 
1) According to Ms. Noland, Norris never went to either 
Florida or Pennsylvania while she worked there. In addition, 
Norris did not have any employees in either state. His only 
contacts in each state appeared to be the attorneys who filed the 
legal documents. 
m) On one occasion, Ms. Noland had to leave the West 
Valley office (Site #2) due to a medical emergency and left her 
car at the office. When Norris returned to the office and found 
her gone with her car in the parking lot, he went to Las Vegas, 
Nevada. He later contacted Ms. Noland and inquired of her as to 
whether she had been questioned by the police. When he returned 
from Las Vegas, Norris instructed Ms. Noland to hang a piece of 
paper in the office window if the police should ever question her 
at the office while he was away. Norris explained that she 
should do this so he could leave the State if the police came. 
21. During the course of our investigation, Investigator Kent 
Nelson and affiant have conducted several interviews of Suzanne 
DeHerrera, formerly employed by Norris. Ms. DeHerrera was hired 
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as a part-time secretary in November 1996, and has provided the 
following information: 
a) Most of DeHerrera's work involved preparing and 
issuing letters, notices, other correspondence, and legal 
documents relating to the advertising agreements and notes. 
Preparation of these documents is prepared on a computer and such 
work is saved on the computer hard drive and/or disks and tapes. 
b) Pursuant to Norris' instructions, she signed many of 
these documents as "Account Executive" for United Investors, 
although she knew nothing about the account. 
c) Pursuant to Norris' direction, she prepared the 
letters, notices, other correspondence, and legal documents on 
behalf of all three corporations: Maxtron, Santos International 
and United Investors. 
d) The letters, notices and other correspondence are 
routinely sent in bulk to a Pennsylvania location where it is 
then redistributed for mailing to the subs located in Utah. The 
legal documents prepared on behalf of Santos International and/or 
United Investors are also sent to an attorney in Pennsylvania for 
filing with the Pennsylvania courts. 
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e) The three Pennsylvania companies (Maxtron, Santos 
International and United Investors) are all operated by Norris 
from his West Valley office (Site #2). The locations identified 
in the corporate records as the business addresses are merely 
mail drops in Pennsylvania where Norris has someone collect the 
mail on his behalf. In addition, Norris operated other 
businesses from his West Valley office (Site #2), including Alta 
Publishing, Norris Publishing, and LaRoe International. 
f) Norris brought Cortez to Salt Lake from California 
and the two currently share the same residence at 4440 
Christopherson Dr. #B, West Valley City, Utah. To her knowledge, 
Cortez has an investigative background and he is responsible for 
"tracking down" people that Norris files suit on. Cortez is also 
responsible for executing upon the judgments obtained from 
Pennsylvania, Norris has listed Cortez as the president of 
Santos International. 
g) Peggy Stone is listed as the president of United 
Investors and is the aunt of Norris. DeHerrera stated that she 
has never met Stone and Stone has never come into the office 
while she has been there. She stated that Stone has worked as an 
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operator for U.S. West for the past 9 to 11 years. DeHerrera 
stated that she has seen the signature of Peggy Stone on various 
documents, but states that it is Norris' signature, not Stone's. 
h) Norris maintains a Maxtron bank account with Zions 
Bank as well as accounts with Integra Bank and Pennsylvania Home 
Savings in Pennsylvania. Norris also maintains separate accounts 
with other banking entities for Santos International, Norris 
Publishing, Alta Publishing, LaRoe International and United 
Investors. Norris is the sole signatory on all accounts, opens 
all mail and handles all incoming payments. 
i) Norris routinely records all telephone conversations 
at the West Valley office (Site #2) from both his personal desk 
and from Cortez' desk; he maintains only one computer at the 
office location where he has a tape back-up done weekly. Norris 
keeps a computer tape back-up at his home and another in a safe 
which is also located at the office. Norris maintains all of his 
files in a back room of the office. 
j) Norris maintains some business records at his 
residence as well as a copy of the computer tape back-up and 
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possibly some audio tapes, some archived records and various 
weapons. 
22. I am aware from my investigation that Norris has pending 
criminal charges in Salt Lake County for allegations involving 
communications fraud involving his business practices through 
LaRoe International. 
23. Your affiant is also aware through training, experience 
and discussions with other law enforcement agents, that searches 
and seizures of evidence from computers requires the seizure of 
the computer as well as all related items such as hardware, 
software and manuals. This is necessary so that a qualified 
computer expert can conduct a thorough, complete and accurate 
examination of the evidence in a laboratory or other controlled 
environment. 
24. Based on all the above facts and information, I have 
reason to believe that RICHARD FRANKLIN NORRIS and EMILIO CORTEZ, 
operating as MAXTRON CORP. (formerly ALTA PUBLISHING), SANTOS 
INTERNATIONAL, and UNITED INVESTORS CREDIT SERVICES, INC. are 
currently engaged in communications fraud to obtain money through 
misrepresentation and fraud. I have reason to believe that they 
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have committed violations of Utah Code Ann. Section 76-10-1801 
(Communications Fraud); Utah Code Ann. Section 76-10-1901 (Money 
Laundering); and Utah Code Ann. Section 76-10-1601 (Pattern of 
Unlawful Activity), and that there is now concealed on the 
premises known as 3392 West 3500 South, West Valley City, Utah, 
and, 4440 Christopherson, West Valley City, Utah, property that 
constitutes evidence of the commission of a criminal offense; 
contraband, the fruits of crime, or things otherwise criminally 
possessed; property designed or intended for use or which is or 
has been used as the means of committing a criminal offense, in 
violation of the Utah statutes previously mentioned; 
specifically: 
A) Records in whatever form of contacts with customers 
and clients of MAXTRON CORP (formerly ALTA PUBLISHING); SANTOS 
INTERNATIONAL; and UNITED INVESTORS CREDIT SERVICES, INC., 
including mailings, receipt of funds, and inquiries. 
B) Banking records, accounting records, check registers, 
deposit slips, money order receipts, receipts for cashiers 
checks, cashiers checks, records of wire transfers in whatever 
17 
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form showing the source and application of funds received from or 
transferred to persons and/or entities. 
C) Records in whatever form relating to mailing and 
receipt of parcels and packages whether U. S. Mail or other 
common carrier. 
D) Safes, indicia of safe deposit boxes, storage 
facilities or similar devices used for storage of records or 
belongings and applications for mail drop boxes. 
E) Promotional materials in whatever form showing the 
information provided to customers and the initial solicitation, 
including copies of promissory notes and/or advertising 
contracts. Copies of any video and/or audio tapes. 
F) Copies of any and all general correspondence and 
business records including: client statements; client 
contracts and/or proposals; subcontract agreements and/or 
contracts; materials describing company concepts; audio/visual 
materials; invoices for the purchase of or services performed for 
the editing, marketing, drafting or graphic design, printing 
and/or binding of various publications; statements relating to 
vendor accounts; canceled checks; bank statements; ledgers; books 
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of accounts; accounting and/or financial records detailing the 
daily business activity of the companies; personal diaries, 
telephone logs; appointment books; checkbooks, information 
pertaining to safe deposit boxes; records indicating the location 
of assets; warehouse shipping and receiving records; commission 
and payroll records; travel records; employee applications; 
marketing scripts; all corporate books and records; documentation 
of fictitious names used by company officers and employees; 
mailing and/or shipping records for both public and private 
carriers; lease agreements; employment contracts; partnership 
agreements; any and all records which identify or pertain to 
individuals having managerial or supervisory responsibility, 
including, but not limited to, records pertaining to Richard 
Franklin Norris and Emilio Cortez; stock certificates and 
investment records. 
G) Any and all information concerning the subject 
businesses stored in the form of magnetic or electronic coding 
on computer or with the aid of computer-related equipment. These 
media include floppy diskettes, fixed hard disks, removable hard 
disk cartridges, tapes, laser disks, printer buffers, smart 
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cards, memory calculators, electronic notebooks, and any other 
media which is capable of storing magnetic coding. Any and all 
electronic devices which are capable of analyzing, creating, 
displaying, converting or transmitting electronic or magnetic 
computer impulses or data. These devices include computers, 
computer components, computer peripherals, word processing 
equipment, modems, monitors, printers, plotters, encryption 
circuit boards, optical scanners, external hard drives, and any 
other computer related electronic devices. Including operating 
systems, application software, utility programs, compilers, 
interpreters, and other programs or software used to communicate 
with the computer hardware or peripherals either directly or 
indirectly via telephone lines, radio, or other means of 
transmission. 
25. Your affiant has probable cause to believe that 
presently, or at the time of the execution of the search warrant 
for which he is applying with this affidavit, there will be in 
the aforementioned locations, property that constitutes evidence 
of the commission of a criminal offense; contraband, the fruits 
of crime, or things otherwise criminally possessed; property 
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designed or intended for use or which is or has been used as the 
means of committing a criminal offense. 
WHEREFORE, the affiant prays that a search warrant be 
issued for the seizure of the above-described items. 
(X) During the daytime as there is reason to 
believe it is necessary to seize the evidence prior 
to its being concealed, altered or destroyed, or for 
other good reasons, to wit: that RICHARD FRANKLIN 
NORRIS and EMILIO CORTEZ, may become aware of this 
investigation, and would at that time be in a 
position to conceal, alter or destroy evidence of 
criminal activities. 
QLASL & — 
RONALD BARTON, Affiant 
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EXHIBIT "A" TO THE AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
Documents relating to the business activities of RICHARD 
FRANKLIN NORRIS and EMILIO CORTEZ, operating as MAXTRON CORP. 
(formerly ALTA PUBLISHING) , SANTOS INTERNATIONAL, and UNITED 
INVESTORS CREDIT SERVICES, INC. 
These documents are more particularly described as follows: 
A) Records in whatever form of contacts with customers 
and clients of MAXTRON CORP (formerly ALTA PUBLISHING); SANTOS 
INTERNATIONAL; and UNITED INVESTORS CREDIT SERVICES, INC, 
including mailings, receipt of funds, and inquiries, 
B) Banking records, accounting records, check registers, 
deposit slips, money order receipts, receipts for cashiers 
checks, cashiers checks, records of wire transfers in whatever 
form showing the source and application of funds received from or 
transferred to persons and/or entities. 
C) Records in whatever form relating to mailing and 
receipt of parcels and packages whether U. S. Mail or other 
common carrier. 
D) Safes, indicia of safe deposit boxes, storage 
facilities or similar devices used for storage of records or 
belongings and applications for mail drop boxes. 
E) Promotional materials in whatever form showing the 
information provided to customers and the initial solicitation, 
including copies of promissory notes and/or advertising 
contracts. Copies of any video and/or audio tapes. 
F) Copies of any and all general correspondence and 
business records including: client statements; client 
contracts and/or proposals; subcontract agreements and/or 
contracts; materials describing company concepts; audio/visual 
materials; invoices for the purchase of or services performed for 
the editing, marketing, drafting or graphic design, printing 
and/or binding of various publications; statements relating to 
vendor accounts; canceled checks; bank statements; ledgers; books 
of accounts; accounting and/or financial records detailing the 
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daily business activity of the companies; personal diaries, 
telephone logs; appointment books; checkbooks, information 
pertaining to safe deposit boxes; records indicating the location 
of assets; warehouse shipping and receiving records; commission 
and payroll records; travel records; employee applications; 
marketing scripts; all corporate books and records; documentation 
of fictitious names used by company officers and employees; 
mailing and/or shipping records for both public and private 
carriers; lease agreements; employment contracts; partnership 
agreements; any and all records which identify or pertain to 
individuals having managerial or supervisory responsibility, 
including, but not limited to, records pertaining to Richard 
Franklin Norris and Emilio Cortez; stock certificates and 
investment records. 
G) Any and all information concerning the subject 
businesses stored in the form of magnetic or electronic coding 
on computer or with the aid of computer-related equipment. These 
media include floppy diskettes, fixed hard disks, removable hard 
disk cartridges, tapes, laser disks, printer buffers, smart 
cards, memory calculators, electronic notebooks, and any other 
media which is capable of storing magnetic coding. Any and all 
electronic devices which are capable of analyzing, creating, 
displaying, converting or transmitting electronic * or magnetic 
computer impulses or data. These devices include computers, 
computer components, computer peripherals, word processing 
equipment, modems, monitors, printers, plotters, encryption 
circuit boards, optical scanners, external hard drives, and any 
other computer related electronic devices. Including operating 
systems, application software, utility programs, compilers, 
interpreters, and other programs or software used to communicate 
with the computer hardware or peripherals either directly or 
indirectly via telephone lines, radio, or other means of 
transmission. 
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Addendum C 
Inventory of Items Seized Under -AUTHORITY OF A WARRANT- on 4/2/97 
At: 3392 West 3500 South West Valley Cit UT 
Case: Norris/Maxtron 
By: Special Agent Ronald Barton, Utah Attorney General 
Rm Evki# Pesciiption/LocationfoigKl Quanity Make/RmDesciipt Model 
B 
B 
B 
B 
B 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
Computrend Keyboaid 
Southwest comer 
Mouse 
Southwest comer 
Power cord 
Southwest comer 
Monitor 
Southwest comer 
CPU 
Southwest Comer 
Box of business checks; Santos 
wrest floor 
Box of business checks; United 
west floor 
Boxof business checks; Matron 
west floor 
Misc. File Folders 
fife cabinet, east wall 
Misc. File Folders 
File Cabinet, East Wall 
Payable Binders; Misc. files 
desk; north wafl 
Smith Corona, word keyboard 
desk top, west wall 
Function keys 
desk top, west wall 
CPU 
desk top, west wall 
Monitor 
Desk Top, west wall 
Power cord 
desk top, west wafl 
Conputer/File Room 
Computei/File Room 
Computei/File Room 
Computei/File Room 
Computei/File Room 
Computei/File Room 
Conputei/File Room 
Computer/File Room 
Computer/File Room 
Computei/File Room 
Computei/File Room 
Computei/File Room 
Computei/File Room 
PWP system 14 
Computei/File Room 
Computei/File Room 
Computei/File Room 
Sk8801B-lU 
CM8428SX 
760245 
Serial # 
M910212675 
95024850 
10811529 
015016 
1TEB1113523 
75039686 
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Inventory of Items Seized Under -AUTHORITY OF A WARRANT- on 4/2/97 
At: 3392 West 3500 South West Vafley Cit UT 
Case: Norris/Maxtron 
By: Special Agent Ronald Barton, Utah Attorney General 
a Evid# Inscription/Location found Quanity Make/RmDescript Model 
17 1 - 3.5" floppy disk 
Floppy drive, CPU 
18 6-3.5" floppy disks 
cabinet, south waD, west end 
19 Misc. File Folders 
Lateral file; east waD 
20 Misc. files; rolodex 
desk area 
21 Misc. documents 
wastebasket 
22 Ledger Sheets 
Desk area 
23 Cassette backup tape 
desk 
1 Binders; Account Records 
Inside door, on floor 
2 Bank Records; Reports; Binder, Misc. 
Inside door, floor 
3 Bank Records; Files, 
Inside Door, floor 
4 Court files; legal papers; civil suit fi 
top of file cabinet b 
5 Metal File Box 
File drawer 
6 Keyboard 
Top of Desk 
7 Mouse 
Desk Top 
8 Power cord 
Desk Top 
9 Monitor 
DeskTop 
Computei/File Room 
Computer/File Room 
Computer/File Room 
Computer/File Room 
Computer/File Room 
Computei/File Room 
Computei/File Room 
Norris Office 
Norris Office 
Norris Office 
Norris Office 
Norris Office 
Keytronic 
Norris Office 
A4Tech 
Norris Office 
Norris Office 
Norris Office 
Serial* 
E03601QL J943618449 
930464292 
7134T M134T247040 
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Inventory of Items Seized Under -AUTHORITY OF A WARRANT- on 4/2/97 
At: 3392 West 3500 South West Valley Cit UT 
Case: Norris/Maxtron 
By: Special Agent Ronald Barton, Utah Attorney General 
Rm Evid# Descrytion/Location found Quanity Make/RmDescript Model 
10 
Serial # 
CPU 
Desk Top 
Deskftx>386 4735AJ2B0250 
Nonis Office 
11 Cassette Tape Backup 
Plastic file box; north wall, lower Nonis Office 
12 Disk Holder, w/5.5" disks 
Bookshelf, north wall Nonis Office 
13 Disk Holder w/5.5" diskettes 
Bookshelf, north wall Nonis Office 
14 Cassette tape backup 
Desk, center drawer Nonis Office 
15 4-3.5" floppy disks 
bookshelf, north wall Nonis Office 
16 Corporate Seals 
Floor Nonis Office 
17 Sales Binders, plastic file case 
Bookcase Nonis Office 
18 Briefcase w/documents 
Floor by desk Nonis Office 
19 3-3.5" floppy disks 
desk top Nonis Office 
20 7 envelopes; misc. papers, tapes 
bookshelves; desk drawer, cab. A Nonis Office 
Misc. File Folders 
File Cabinet, 3rd drawer Office 
Misc. File Folders 
File Cabinet, 3rd drawer Office 
Misc. files 
desk Office 
Contractor Layouts 
Shelves; south wall 
Contractor Layouts 
shelves 
Storage 
Storage 
3 
Inventoiy of Items Seized Under -AUTHORITY OF A WARRANT- on 4/2/97 
At: 3392 West 3500 South West Valley Cit UT 
Case: Norris/Maxtron 
By: Special Agent Ronald Barton, Utah Attorney General 
m Evid# Description/Location found Quanity Make/Rm Descript Model 
3 contractor layouts 
shelves Storage 
4 United Statements; checks; envel 
Shelves, south wall Storage 
5 Advertising brochures; 
shelves, south wall Storage 
6 advertising brochures 
shelves, south wall Storage 
7 United stationery; agreements; sponsor 
shelves; south wall Storage 
8 Advertising brochures 
shelves, south wall Storage 
9 advertisin g brochures 
shelves, south wall Storage 
10 advertising brochures 
shelves, south wall Storage 
11 Misc. papers, contracts, etc 
Trash, storage room Storage 
Serial # 
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wventoiy of Items Seized Under -AUTHORITY OF A WARRANT*- on 4/2/97 
At: 4440 Christopberson Dr. U B West Valley Ck UT 
C M * : NoiraMaxfron 
By: Lt Ronald Barton. Attorney General 
Rm 
H 
H 
H 
H 
H 
H 
H 
H 
H 
H 
H 
H 
H 
H 
H 
H 
Evid# 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
S 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
De5cnptioa^^ Quanity Make/Rm Descript 
Conner Minicartridge Tape 
Left tide of b«d hetdbottd 
Conner Minicartridge Tape 
Left side of bed headboard 
31/2" tkppy disks 
Left side of bed headboard 
Oiecfa, check carbons, deposi receipt 
. Left side of bed hcacftoard 
Tckpboac/addrcss boofcs 
Right side of bed headboard 
M»oeIlancoiis papers 
Right side of bed headboard 
F2e &Uer * An*©* vs Richard Nora" 
Right site of bed headboard 
Fik&kl<shHSBbybck" 
Right side of bed headboard 
Fib Folder "Cobos, Vfctor* 
Right eidg of bed headboard 
Audio cassette 
Right sile of bed headboard 
Audio cassenc 
Right side of bed headboard 
Audio Cassette 
Right side of bed headboard 
Audio Cassette 
Right side of bed headboard 
Audio Cassette 
Right aide of bed headboard 
3 Ring binder, Uroe fatenutional 
Right side of bed headboard 
CA-BPI Accounting I software 
Right side of bed headboard 
Master Bedroom 
Master Bedroom 
Master Bedroom 
Master Bedroom 
Master Bedroom 
Master Bedroom 
Master Bedroom 
Master Bedroom 
Master Bedroom 
Master Bedroom 
Master Bedroom 
Master Bedroom 
Master Bedroom 
Master Bedroom 
Master Bcdiooin 
Master Bedroom 
Model SeraJff 
420QT 
d20QT 
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Inventory of Items Seized Under -AUTHORTTY OF A WARRANT- on 4/2/97 
At: 4440 ChristophcrsonDr. # B West VaSey Cff UT 
Case: Noiris/Maxtron 
By: Lt RonaJd Barton, Attorney General 
to Evid# DescriptioQlxKatioQfound Quaaty MakftRmDescript Model Seral# 
17 Audio Cassette 
€k>3ct Master bedroom 
18 Fin 
Presecroh photos Master Bedroom 
19 Fife 
Ptes earch photo s Mas ter Bedroom 
I Miscellaneous papers 
Wmdowsill Kkchcn/Diaiag 
2 
xv^cui^dX!. U f ,UU<JUMENTS 
This document will acknowledge that on this date, the 
following described documents were released from the custody of the 
Consumer Rights Division, Office of the Attorney General, pursuant 
to request of David R. Maddox, counsel for Richard Norris. 
Said documents are described as: 
a) an envelope addressed to: Third District, Judge 
Edward Watson, West Valley City Circuit Court, 
3600 Constitution Blvd., West Valley City, UT 
b) an envelope addressed to: Mr. Elliot R. Lawrence, 
West Valley City Attorney's Office, 3600 
Constitution Blvd., West Valley City, UT 
c) an envelope addressed to: C. Danny Frazier, 
Attorney for the Appellee-Defendant, 
3 9 West 300 North, Provo, UT 
d) an envelope addressed to: Court Clerk, Utah 
State Court of Appeals, 23 0 South 500 East, 
Suite 400, Salt Lake City, UT 
This will further acknowledge that documents a, b and c were 
placed in the United States Mail and document d was delivered to 
the Utah Court of Appeals. 
Said documents having been seized by the Utah Attorney 
General's Office on April 2, 1997, pursuant to Search Warrant dated 
April 1, 1997, from the business location of Richard Norris, dba 
Maxtron Corporation, 3392 West 3500 South, West Valley City, Utah. 
DATED this 2T~day of , 1997. 
[APT &XAP_ «= 
CHARLENE BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
Consumer Rights Division 
RECEIPT FOR RETURN OF ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE 
This document will acknowledge my receipt of the electronic 
items described on Attachment *A" hereto, from the Utah Division of 
Investigations and the Consumer Rights Division, Office of the 
Attorney General, 
Said items having been seized on April 2, 1331, pursuant to 
Search Warrant dated April 1, 1997, from the business location o£ 
Richard F. Norris, 3392 West 3500 South, West Valley City, Utah. 
DATED this £fday of /7^£sU^r , 1997. 
^ ^ 
(Signature) 
(Printed Name) 
WITNESS: 
ATTACHMENT "A" TO STIPULATION/RECEIPT AS TO 
RETURN OF ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE 
(Richard F.Norris) 
Inventory 
ISa, 
Bl 
B2 
B3 
134 
B5 
D14 
D15 
B16 
C6 
C7 
C8 
C9 
CIO 
Original 
Equipment PcgcriPttoP.; 
Computrend Keyboard 
Mouse 
Powcrcord 
Monitor 
CPU 
CPU, PWP System 14 
Monitor 
Powercord 
Keytronic Keyboard 
A-4 Tech Mouse 
Power Cord 
Monitor 7134T 
CPU, DcskPro 386 
Description of 
Duplicate Hard Privet 
M910212675 
95024850 
— 
10811529 
015016 
1TEB1113523 
75039686 
-
J943618449 
930464292 
— 
M134T247040 
4735AJ2B0250 
RECEIPT FOR RETURN OF ORIGINAL SEIZED EVIDENCE 
This document will acknowledge my receipt of the following 
original items, from the Consumer Rights Division, Office of the 
Attorney General. 
Said items having been seized on April 2, 1997, pursuant to a 
Search Warrant dated April 1, 1997, from the business location of 
Richard Norris, 3392 West 3500 South, West Valley City, Utah. 
lis _^2 day of jC/p^sS DATED thi  ^ul  fy,fjLM*J' , 1997 
-^signature 
Printed Name 
WITNESS : 
^M-fL C'Ultfsc 
ATTACHMENT UA" TO RECEIPT FOR RETURN 
OF ORIGINAL SEIZED EVIDENCE 
Description: 
1) Box of Blank Checks: Santos International Inc., Pittsburgh 
Home Savings Bank. No. 0101 thru' 03 00 
2) Box of Blank Checks: United Investors Credit Services, Inc., 
Zions Bank, Utah, Acct. No. 012-11518-4. No. 0201 thru' 0300 
3) Box of Blank Checks: United Investors Credit Services, Inc., 
Integra Bank, Pittsburgh, PA. No. 176 thru' 3 00 
4) Box of Blank Checks: Maxtron Corporation, Zions Bank, Utah, 
Acct. No. 012-11519-2. No. 1076 thru' 1175 
RECEIPT FOR RETURN OF ORIGINAL SEIZED EVIDENCE 
lis document will acknowledge my receipt of the following 
al items, from the Consumer Rights Division, Office of the 
*y General. 
1 Box of computerized checks, Santos International, 
Pittsburgh, PA - commencing with No. 01170 
(Inventory No. B-6) 
1 Box of computerized checks, United Investors 
Credit Services, Inc., Pittsburgh, PA - commencing 
With No. 01176 - (Inventory No. B-7) 
1 Box of computerized checks, Maxtron Corporation, 
Philadelphia, PA - commencing with No. 01252 
(Inventory No. B-8) 
1 Package of blank statement forms, United 
Investors Credit Services, Inc. 
1 Box Window Envelopes, United Investors 
Credit Services, Inc. - (Inventory No. 1-6) 
1 Package of blank "Contract Purchase Summary 
Forms", United Investors; 1 Package of blank 
"Sponsor's Publishing Agreement", Maxtron Corporation; 
1 Package of blank Advertising Agreement" forms, 
Maxtron Corporation; 1 Package of blank "Promissory Note" 
forms, Maxtron Corporation; 1 Package of letterhead, 
United Investor's Credit Services (Inventory No. 1-7) 
id items having been seized on April 2, 1997, pursuant to a 
Warrant dated April 1, 1997, from the business location of 
Norris, 3392 West 3500 South, West Valley City, Utah. 
TED this J^ T day of ^ / j ^ ^ , 1997. 
Signature (Richard Norris) 
L/UJL. V6M 
RECEIPT FOR RETURN OF ORIGINAL SEIZED EVIDENCE 
This document will acknowledge my receipt of the original 
items identified on Attachment "A", from the Consumer Rights 
Division, Office of the Utah Attorney General. 
Said items having been seized on April 2, 1997, pursuant to a 
Search Warrant dated April 1, 1997, from the business location of 
Richard Norris, 33 92 West 3500 South, West Valley City, Utah. 
DATED this /6> day of ^njj\ - , 1997, 
— - - > - ,_ 
Signature (Richard Norris) 
WITNESS 
Norris Publishing dba LaRoe v. 
Utley, Kaye 
Norris Publishing dba LaRoe v. 
Coit, Darla 
(BOX 2) 
LaRoe International 
(1) Plastic File Case 
Containing Alphabetial 
Files 
(2) Package of individual (48) 
account cards w/attachments 
(3) Misc. File Folders: 
Cobos, Victor 
Hunter, Randy 
Amtext vs. Richard Norris 
Blaylock, Bill 
Tueller, Doug 
(4) Unlabeled folders containing: 
Slesser, Douglas (3) 
Norris vs. Elmer 
Norris vs. Norton 
Norris vs. Beardall (3) 
Norris vs. Castillo (2) 
(5) Empty Alphabetical folders, 
A,D,G,I,J,L,N,Q,R,U,V,X,Y,Z 
(6) 3-Ring, Red Binder, labeled 
"LaRoe International Independent 
Advisor Training Manual 
(7) 2 Large File Folders; 
G.A.P. (Great American Publishing) 
and LaRoe International 
(BOX 3 through 7) 
Printed Materials, copies of miscellaneous advertising 
brochures 
RECEIPT FOR RETURN OF ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE 
This document will acknowledge my receipt of the electronic 
item described below from the Utah Division of Investigations and 
the Consumer Rights Division, Office of the Attorney General. 
Radio Shack Telephone Cassette Recorder 
Model No. 43-273 
Serial No. 103389 3A6 
w/cords and power supply AC adapter, No. 9620 
Said items having been seized on April 2, 1997, pursuant to 
Search Warrant dated April 1, 1997, from the business location of 
Richard F. Norris, 3392 West 3500 South, West Valley City, Utah. 
DATED this jj^ day of V/ >L ^  , 1997 
(Printed Name) 
RECEIPT FOR RETURN OF ORIGINAL SEIZED EVIDENCE 
This document will acknowledge my receipt of the original 
items identified on Attachment "A", from the Consumer Rights 
Division, Office of the Utah Attorney General. 
Said items having been seized on April 2, 1997, pursuant to a 
Search Warrant dated April 1, 1997, from the business location of 
Richard Norris, 3392 West 3500 South, West Valley City, Utah. 
DATED this /£ day of v ] ^ ^ , 1998 
Signature (Richard Norris) 
WITNESS 
[^LAIC^ 
ATTACHMENT "A" to RECEIPT FOR RETURN OF ORIGINAL EVIDENCE 
(Richard Norris dba Maxtron) 
Utah Tax CommigsJQn - Documents: 
a) Coupon Book - Income Tax Withholding 1997 for Maxtron 
b) Coupon Book - Income Tax Withholding 1997 for Great American 
Publishing 
Internal Revenue Service - Documents: 
a) Federal Tax Deposit Coupon Books (1997) for: Norris 
Publishing; Maxtron Corp; United Investors Credit Services; 
Norris Publishing; Santos International 
b) Employer's Quarterly Federal Tax Return form - Norris 
Publishing 
c) Schedule B - Employer's Record of Federal Tax Liability -
State of Pennsylvania - Documents: 
a) Business Privilege Tax Return - 1997 (United Investors) 
w/instructions & envelopes 
b) Business Privilege Tax Return - 1997 (Santos) 
c) Commonwealth of Pennsylvania REV-1200 PA Corporation Tax 
Report Booklet, 1996 
d) Coupon Book - PA Department of Revenue - Bureau of Corporation 
Taxes 1997 for Maxtron 
e) Coupon Book - PA Department of Revenue - Bureau of Corporation 
Taxes 1997 for United Investors 
f) Coupon Book - Philadelphia Revenue Department - 1997 Quarterly 
Wage Tax - Maxtron 
g) Mercantile Tax Return - Santos International - 1997 -
h) Coupons (12) - 1997 - City of Pittsburgh, Occupation Tax 
Return for Santos International and United Investors 
Miscellaneous Documents: 
a) 4 Marketing/Advertising Books - Anderson Homes (Shadow Acres] 
RECEIPT FOR RETURN OF ORIGINAL SEIZED EVIDENCE 
This document will acknowledge my receipt of the following 
listed original items, from the Consumer Rights Division, Office of 
the Utah Attorney General: 
Internal Revenue Service - Documents: 
a) Federal Tax Deposit Coupon Books (1997) for: Norris 
Publishing; Santos International 
State of Utah Documents: 
a) Employer's Quarterly Wage List, Job Service, for Maxtron 
Corporation. 
Miscellaneous Documents: 
a) Original Check #4262, from Salt Lake County Sheriff Service 
Fee account, dated 3/6/97, in the amount of $27.00. 
b) Original Check #4332, from Salt Lake County Sheriff Service 
Fee Account, dated 3/26/97, in the amount of $15.00, attached 
to Weber County Small Claims Affidavit and Order, with Sheriff 
return of service. 
c) 3 legal size pressboard binders, containing copies of 
unnumbered blank stock certificates for the State of 
Pennsylvania 
d) 1 (8.5" x 11") brown leather folder, no contents 
e) 1 5.25" SKC diskette labeled "V 8.00 Diags (Test Insert & 
Setup)" 
Said items having been seized on April 2, 1997, pursuant to a 
Search Warrant dated April 1, 1997, from the business location of 
Richard Norris, 3392 West 3500 South, West Valley City, Utah. 
DATED this day of &4AsAtM^~~)y ^ y,, 1998. 
Signature^XRicharcl "Norris) 
WITNESS: 
<2mcA 
OFFICE OF THE UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CONSUMER RIGHTS DIVISION 
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
RECEIPT FOR RETURN OF ORIGINAL SEIZED EVIDENCE 
This document will acknowledge my receipt of the original 
items identified on Attachment "A", from the Consumer Rights 
Division, Office of the Utah Attorney General. 
Said items having been seized on April 2, 1997, pursuant to a 
Search Warrant dated April 1, 1997, from the business location of 
Richard Norris, 3392 West 3500 South, West Valley City, Utah. 
DATED thi ./Z*£ day of 2kJL_. 1998 
Signature Norris) 
WITNE 
ATTACHMENT "A" to RECEIPT FOR RETURN OF ORIGINAL EVIDENCE 
(Richard Norris dba Maxtron) 
Briefcase containing: 
pocket calculator; business card file; recorder and microphone 
(Evidence C-18) 
Telephone Address Book (Evidence H-5) 
Diary Planner 
Month-at-a-Glance (Academic/Fiscal Planner 1996-97) 
Box with miscellaneous advertising/marketing brochures 
Box with miscellaneous advertising/marketing brochures 
Box containing: 
* 36 file folders labeled Norris Box 10 containing 
miscellaneous documents 
* 4 file folders labeled Norris Box 15 containing 
miscellaneous documents 
* 7 file folders labeled Norris Box 12 containing 
miscellaneous documents 
* 3 file folders labeled Norris Box 19 containing 
miscellaneous documents 
* 1 file folder labeled Norris Box 5 containing 
miscellaneous documents 
* 4 file folders labeled Norris Box 7 containing 
miscellaneous documents 
* 1 file folder labeled Norris Box 8 containing 
miscellaneous documents 
* 1 file folder labeled Norris Box 16 containing 
miscellaneous documents 
* 3 file folders labeled Norris Box 33 containing 
miscellaneous documents. 
* 2 file folders labeled Norris Box 14 containing 
miscellaneous documents 
* 1 file folder labeled Norris Box 23 containing 
miscellaneous documents 
Box containing: 
* Legal Size Expanding File folder containing miscellaneous 
documents 
* Red hanging folder labeled Miscellaneous 
* file folder labeled Mastercard 
* file folder labeled Richard Norris (Quintana) 
* file folder labeled Rick's Personal 1997 bank statements 
* Yellow handing folder labeled Maxtron Corporate Records 
* file folder labeled State Sales Tax - Misc. 
* file folder labeled 1997 Payroll Reports 
* file folder labeled Ricks Personal Checking 
* file folder labeled Santos: A/P to be Paid 
* file folder labeled Maxtron: A/P to be Paid 
* file folder labeled United: A/P to be Paid 
* file folder labeled UPS 
* file folder (orange) labeled Work 12-94 - Jan. 97 
* file folders (7) unlabeled containing miscellaneous docs. 
Plastic envelope labeled "Room C on Floor by Desk 5c Bookcases" 
containing file folder labeled Norris A/P to be paid; 
envelope from City of Philadelphia 
1 Expanding file folder, not labeled; containing 
various invoices 
1 Large envelope labeled Norris Box 3, "Brinkerhoff" 
1 Large envelope labeled "Visitors G.D." 
) 1 Box miscellaneous items: 
* card index file 
* misc. index cards (3x5) 
* envelope containing (9) small spiral notebooks 
* 3 corporate seals 
* rolodex file 
* duplicate audio tapes (8) 
* 5 writing instruments 
* cancelled checks 
* checkbooks 
* deposit slips 
) (Ten) Kinkos boxes of copies of documents, the originals of 
which have been retained by AG's office. 
Addendum D 
hourth Judicial Districf'cbuW 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
CARMA B. SMITH, Clerk 
fi Deputy 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RICHARD F. NORRIS, 
Defendant. 
CASE NUMBER: 981403794 
DATED: MARCH 31, 2000 
RULING ON MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS 
ANTHONY W. SCHOFIELD, JUDGE 
This case is before the court on defendant's motion to suppress all evidence seized 
pursuant to a search warrant issued on April 1, 1997, by Third District Judge Sheila K 
McCleve, sitting as magistrate. After I heard the evidence at a two-day preliminary 
hearing in May 1999,1 bound the matter over for trial. Thereafter this case was assigned 
to the Honorable Donald J. Eyre, Fourth District Court Judge.1 It now is set for a multi-
1
 There is in the file a notice of reassignment-recusal. Some further explanation as to this 
document is appropriate. From January 1998 to July 1999 I was assigned under the 4th District 
division plan to the criminal division of the court and this case was assigned to me. After hearing 
the preliminary hearing I found probable cause and bound the matter over for trial. As I was 
scheduled shortly to rotate out of the criminal division and Judge Ray M. Harding was scheduled to 
replace me in the criminal division, and because David Sturgill, defendant's appointed counsel, had 
recently concluded a term as law clerk/bailiff for Judge Harding, in accordance with a policy of the 
4th District Court which requires judges to recuse in cases in which recent, former law clerks have 
appeared as counsel, it was agreed that I would enter an order recusing Judge Harding from this 
case and making an assignment to another judge in the criminal division. I did so. While the 
reassignment-recusal implies that grounds exist for my recusal in this case, that is not accurate. 
Rather, Judge Harding, to whom this case would have passed under the 4th District division plan, 
did. I entered the recusal assigning the case away from him and to Judge Eyre. 
1 
day jury trial to begin April 10, 2000. With that trial date looming, and Judge Eyre having 
blocked out several days for the trial, defendant moved to suppress the fruits of the search, 
asserting defects with the warrant and the underlying affidavit. At the suggestion, and 
upon the stipulation of the parties, ostensibly because they believed my familiarity with the 
case would allow for a quick ruling on the motion to suppress, the case was assigned to 
me by Judge Eyre in his capacity as presiding judge of the 4th District. I therefore will rule 
on the motion to suppress and return the case to Judge Eyre. 
1 have carefully reviewed the memoranda of the parties, the affidavit executed 
upon application for the search warrant, the search warrant issued by the magistrate and 
controlling case law. I now issue this ruling granting the motion to suppress. 
Factual Setting 
The underlying facts in this case are not in dispute. On April 1, 1997, Ronald 
Barton, a Special Agent for the Utah Attorney General's Office, Consumer Rights 
Division, a trained peace officer, appeared before the magistrate seeking issuance of a 
search warrant. Barton executed his affidavit in front of the magistrate and the magistrate 
issued a warrant.2 The warrant describes two premises to be searched, a residence (site 
#1) and a business (site #2). The warrant directed search for: 
Documents relating to the business activities of RICHARD FRANKLIN 
NORRIS AND EMILIO CORTEZ, operating as MAXTRON CORP. 
(formerly ALTA PUBLISHING), SANTOS INTERNATIONAL, and 
UNITED INVESTORS CREDIT SERVICES, INC. 
2
 While the warrant and affidavit were not entered as evidence at the hearing, each side 
provided the court with a copy of the warrant and affidavit. Thankfully they were the same. So 
that the record may be complete, I have attached to the original of this ruling one of those copies 
together with the return on the warrant. 
2 
The warrant then noted that "[t]hese documents and computer files are more fully 
described on Exhibit 'A' attached hereto." A two page exhibit "A" was attachecj^ vhich 
identified seven categories of documents and things to search for. Finally, the warrant 
provided conclusory findings: 
[T]hat the above described property or evidence; 
(X) has been used to commit or conceal a public offense; 
(X) is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means of committing 
or concealing a public offense; 
(X) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal conduct, possessed 
by a party to the illegal conduct. 
The warrant directed a search "of the above-described premises for the above-described 
property or evidence 
From the returns on the warrant it is clear a search took place. Computers and 
many, many files were taken. Over a period of more than two months some of the 
materials were returned. 
Analysis and Ruling 
Defendant raises five objections to the warrant. As to four of these, I am not 
persuaded, and deny suppression on each of those four grounds. As to the fifth, however, 
defendant is correct in his analysis. The warrant is over broad. 
The warrant is over broad. 
The starting point for an analysis is the Fourth Amendment. It provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the 
persons or things to be seized . . . . 
If this amendment means anything, it is that a warrant must describe with 
particularity items to be seized by an executing officer. The Supreme Court has 
"recognize[d] that there are grave dangers inherent in executing a warrant authorizing a 
search and seizure of a person's papers . . . . Responsible officials, including judicial 
officials, must take care to assure that they are conducted in a manner that minimizes 
unwarranted intrusions on privacy." Andresen v. Maryland, All U.S. 463, 482, n. 11 
(1976). As citizens of this country, each of us is vested with a right to be secure from 
unwarranted intrusions on our privacy The ability of government officials to rummage 
unfettered through a person's private papers is one aspect of the evils against which the 
Fourth Amendment sought to protect. It did so by requiring that a warrant particularly 
describe the items for which the executing officers may search. This requirement was 
succinctly stated by the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Leary, 846 F.2d 592, 602 (10th 
Cir. 1988): 
As an irreducible minimum, a proper warrant must allow the executing 
officers to distinguish between items that may and may not be seized. 
This does not express a principle. The Fourth Amendment expresses a right: the 
right of each citizen to be secure from unwarranted governmental intrusions into our 
private affairs. In this case the warrant did not square with that right. Rather, it was over 
broad-way over broad. Let me explain. 
In this case the warrant directed search of both the business premises and the home 
of defendant. Through the attached Exhibit "A", the warrant identified seven categories 
of items to be searched for and seized. In defense of the warrant, the State claims that the 
4 
warrant cannot be over broad because it authorized search for specifically identified items 
and records. It also claims that the warrant cannot be over broad as it only allowed search 
for business records, not the personal records of Norris. In a sense the State is right on 
both of these points. Yet, in making these arguments the State is missing the forest for the 
trees. 
The warrant is over broad, not because it failed to identify specific items or classes 
of documents and records to be searched for, but because these classes of records are so 
broad, so all encompassing, that there was nothing in the business records of Norris, 
Maxtron, Santos or United which was not subject to search and seizure. A review of the 
attached Exhibit "A" bears this out. 
Paragraph A. 
Paragraph A of the exhibit directs search for "[rjecords in whatever form of 
contacts with customers and clients of Maxtron . . . Santos . . . and United . . . ." This is 
a broad description permitting the State to look at every record of Norris, Maxtron, 
Santos and United pertaining to any business with their customers and clients. Applied in 
the context of the affidavit, and given the nature of the communications fraud set forth in 
the affidavit, it may not be too broad.3 But, when viewed in conjunction with the 
extremely broad authority described hereafter, it is clear that the cumulative is just too 
3
 It is true that in alluding to the affidavit, I gloss over the issue of whether the affidavit 
may properly be considered, which raises the issue of whether the affidavit was properly 
incorporated by reference, a whole other issue. Given the result hereafter, I need not resolve this 
point. 
5 
great.4 
Paragraph B. 
Paragraph B directs search for "[b]anking records, accounting records, check 
registers, deposit slips, money order receipts, receipts for cashiers checks, cashiers checks, 
records of wire transfers in whatever form showing the source and application of funds 
received from or transferred to persons and/or entities." This also is a broad description 
permitting the State to look at every single business banking or accounting record of 
Norris, Maxtron, Santos or United. Even though the affidavit describes a rather pervasive 
scheme, as with the authority set forth in paragraph A, when the direction in paragraph B 
is read in conjunction with the other authority described hereafter, this authorization is too 
broad. 
Paragraph C. 
Paragraph C directs search for u[r]ecords in whatever form relating to mailing and 
receipt of parcels and packages whether U.S. Mail or other common carrier." This is a 
broad description permitting a review of all of the incoming and outgoing mail of Norris, 
Maxtron, Santos or United. Even though they used the mail for much of their scheme, 
authority to search the incoming and outgoing mail and mail logs should have been much 
more narrowly drawn, so that only the records clearly relating to the scheme would have 
been subject to the search. 
4
 One may ask how an officer, seeking a warrant for the search and seizure of business 
records, should draft the warrant so that it will be appropriately narrow and limited, truly a hard 
question. But, in issuing this ruling I need not answer that question if the search authority is 
patently too broad, as I find it to be. 
6 
Paragraph F. 
Paragraph F5 directs search for "[c]opies of any and all general correspondence 
and business records including . . . ." (Emphasis added.) Needless to say, this search 
authorization is broad, tremendously broad. On its face it commands search for and 
seizure of every business record in the possession of Norris, Maxtron, Santos or United. 
Taken literally, this paragraph directs the executing officers to back a truck up to the door 
and take every business record or file having to do with Norris, Maxtron, Santos or 
United. 
If, as defendant claims, this paragraph does not permit the proverbial fishing 
expedition for incriminating records, it is difficult to conceive of a provision which would. 
On its face, this paragraph directs search for and seizure of all business records. There is 
no limitation, no restriction. 
In a clarifying phrase the paragraph authorized search for and seizure of such 
patently irrelevant records as personal diaries, payroll records and employee applications. 
Arguably other records identified also are entirely irrelevant, such as lease agreements, 
employment contracts, travel records and partnership agreements. Standing alone, this 
paragraph, having no limitation as to which business records could be searched for or 
seized, is over broad. When read in conjunction with the very broad authorizations set 
forth in paragraphs A, B and C, the warrant crosses the line from constitutionality to 
unconstitutionality. It is altogether too broad. 
Paragraph G. 
5
 I do not find either Paragraph D or E over broad and thus do not discuss them here. 
7 
Finally, paragraph G permitted in broad brush fashion search for u[a]ny and all 
information concerning the subject business stored in the form of magnetic or electronic 
coding on computer or with the aid of computer-related equipment. . . ." This is a broad 
invitation to search for and seize any and all business records and files stored on 
computer.6 By this the State was given carte blanche to review every single computer 
record or file of Norris, Maxtron, Santos or United. This authorization is over broad. 
In so many ways this case is like Leary. And the reasoning there fits well into the 
factual circumstances of this case. In discussing the particularity requirement, the Leary 
court noted: 
The fourth amendment requires that warrants "particularly 
describ[e]... the persons or things to be seized. . . . This requirement 
prevents a "general, exploratory rummaging in a person's belongings," . . . 
and "'makes general searches . . . impossible and prevents the seizure of 
one thing under a warrant describing another. As to what is to be taken, 
nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.'" . . . 
"The particularity requirement [also] ensures that a search is confined in 
scope to particularly described evidence relating to a specific crime for 
which there is demonstrated probable cause." 
The test applied to the description of the items to be seized is a 
practical one. "c A description is sufficiently particular when it enables the 
searcher to reasonably ascertain and identify the things authorized to be 
seized.'" . . . Even a warrant that describes the items to be seized in broad 
or generic terms may be valid "when the description is as specific as the 
circumstances and the nature of the activity under investigation permit." ... 
However, the fourth amendment requires that the government describe the 
items to be seized with as much specificity as the government's knowledge 
and circumstances allow, and "warrants are conclusively invalidated by 
their substantial failure to specify as nearly as possible the distinguishing 
6
 In fact it appears from the documents attached to the warrant and affidavit that in fact 
the officers seized the computers from the business establishment. I also note, parenthetically, that 
the returns also make clear, as defendant complained in his motion, that the officers seized records 
having to do with a business not identified in the affidavit, LaRoe International. 
8 
characteristics of the goods to be seized." 
Leary, 846 F.2d at 600, all citations omitted. 
In Leary the court found the warrant invalid because the warrant contained only 
two limitations on the search: 
First, the documents to be seized had to fall within a long list of business 
records typical of the documents kept by an export company. Second, 
those documents had to relate to "the purchase, sale and illegal exportation 
of materials in violation of the" federal export laws. In this context-the 
search of the offices of an export company-these limitations provide no 
limitation at all. The warrant authorizes, and the customs agents 
conducted, a general search of the Kleinberg offices. 
Leary, 846F.2dat 600-01. 
This case is no different. The warrant authorized the search of all of the business 
correspondence and business records of Norris, Maxtron, Santos and United and all of 
their business computer files and records, a general, rummaging search. As well, it 
authorized search of all of their business banking and accounting records and all of their 
business incoming and outgoing mail records. There was no limitation imposed by the 
warrant on the authority of the executing officers to dig through every last business 
document at the office and at Norris' home and to seize all of them. 
This case also is closely analogous to Voss v. Bergsgaard, 11A F.2d 402, 404 (10th 
Cir. 1985). There the Tenth Circuit found the warrant over broad with this explanation: 
The particularity requirement ensures that a search is confined in 
scope to particularly described evidence relating to a specific crime for 
which there is demonstrated probable cause. The government affidavit 
supporting the warrants at issue alleged a scheme of tax fraud, and the 
district court found that probable cause existed. The bulk of the warrant 
was not restricted to evidence relating to tax fraud, however. It authorized 
government agents to rummage through all of the [defendant business'] 
customer files, bank records, employee records, precious metal records, 
9 
marketing and promotional literature, and more, seeking any information 
pertaining to any federal crime. 
Other than as noted in the very last phrase, which clarifies that in Voss the warrant 
allowed search for any information pertaining to any federal cnme, what the warrant in 
Voss allowed, and what this warrant also allows, was a general rummaging through all of 
the business records of Norris, Maxtron, Santos and United. There simply was no 
restriction nor limitation. The scope of the permitted search in this case was not 
reasonably related to uncovering evidence of a particular crime, but was the most glorious 
kind of fishing expedition-a charter off the Mexican Baja marlin fishing-seeking some 
evidence of communications fraud. The warrant in this case is over broad. It must be 
stricken and any evidence obtained by the search suppressed. 
The warrant does not state a charge. 
I accept the State's analysis and conclude that applicable law does not require that 
the warrant, standing alone, state the charge for which the search is authorized. The 
affidavit set forth with sufficient particularity the nature of the scheme of communications 
fraud. I deny suppression on this ground. 
The warrant includes non-party business records. 
While it may be, as defendant alleges, that the search resulted in the seizure of 
business records having to do with entities other than the target entities described in the 
affidavit, at the most, this is just a further extension of the argument that the warrant was 
over broad. I do not find that this ground provides a separate basis for suppression, and 
deny suppression on this ground. 
The officer used expunged information in obtaining the warrant. 
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I do not accept defendant's analysis that the officer relied upon expunged 
information in obtaining the warrant and deny suppression on this ground. 
The review by the magistrate of the affidavit and warrant was inadequate* 
This last argument is that the magistrate erred in concluding that the affidavit 
established probable cause. I disagree. As in Voss, any fair reading of the affidavit leads 
to the conclusion that the officer described a pattern of conduct between Norris, Maxtron, 
Santos and United which worked a fraud on many individuals. That pattern was explained 
in sufficient detail and precision that a magistrate would find probable cause that Norris 
and his companies were engaged in a scheme or pattern of criminal fraud and that the 
fraud fit within the statutory proscription of communication fraud. I find that the afiBdavit 
provided probable cause that criminal activity was afoot. I deny suppression on this 
ground. 
Conclusion. 
The warrant was over broad. I grant the motion to suppress on that ground but 
deny the motion on all other grounds raised by defendant. The evidence seized in the 
search must be suppressed. Defendant's counsel is directed to prepare an appropriate 
order. 
Dated this JI day of March, 2000. 
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'-18-9 Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Administrative finding" means a decision upon a question of fact 
reached by an administrative agency following an administrative hearing or 
other procedure satisfying the requirements of due process. 
(2) "Certificate of eligibility" means a document issued by the division 
stating that the criminal record which is the subject of a petition for 
expungement is eligible for expungement. 
(3) "Conviction" means judgment by a criminal court on a verdict or finding 
of guilty after trial, a plea of guilty, or a plea of nolo contendere. 
(4) "Division" means the Criminal Investigations and Technical Services 
Division of the Department of Public Safety established in Section 53-10-
103. 
(5) "Expungement" means the sealing or destruction of a criminal record, 
including records of the investigation, arrest, detention, or conviction of 
the petitioner. 
(6) "Jurisdiction" means an area of authority. 
(7) "Petitioner" means a person seeking expungement under this chapter. 
(8) Second degree forcible felony includes: 
(a) aggravated assault, if the person intentionally causes serious bodily 
injury; 
(b) aggravated assault by a prisoner; 
(c) aggravated assault on school premises; 
(d) intentional child abuse; 
(e) criminally negligent automobile homicide; 
(f) reckless child abuse homicide; 
(g) mayhem; 
(h) manslaughter; 
(i) kidnaping; 
(j) forcible sexual abuse; 
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(k) robbery; 
(1) felony fleeing causing death or serious bodily injury; or 
(m) delivery of an explosive to a common carrier. 
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